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INTRODUCTION
One thousand two hundred and forty-six United States species1
have either a threatened or endangered listing under the Endangered
Species Act (ESA).2 According to one reporter, "[a]pproximately 16
percent of species in the U.S. are in 'immediate danger of extinction.'
Thirty-three percent of the animals and plants on the Endangered
Species List are declining."3 Congress adopted the Endangered Spe-
cies Act, the so-called "pit bull of environmental laws," 4 to prevent the
extinction of species after it found that species in the United States
and abroad were becoming extinct.5 In modern times, the "rate of
petitioning for species to be protected under the Endangered Species
Act is accelerating." 6 The ESA, because of its broad protective provi-
sions, can impact people from every walk of life in the United States.7
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) administer the ESA.8 Under
1 "The term 'species' includes any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any
distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds
when mature." Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (1994).
2 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES SYSTEM (TESS),
at http://ecos.fws.gov/tess/html/boxscore.html (last visited Oct 11, 2001). See generally
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (establish-
ing statutory parameters for threatened and endanagered classifications).
3 Elizabeth Grossman, Species on the Brink of a Nervous Breakdown: A Record Pace of Ex-
tinction Threatens American Flora and Fauna, GRISr MAG., Sept 19, 2000, at 2 (quoting DAVID
S. WiLcovE, THE CONDOR'S SHADOw: THE Loss AND RECOVERY OF WILDLIFE IN AMERICA 231
(1999)), at http://www.gristmagazine.com/grist/books/books091900.stm.
4 Nancy K. Kubasek et al., Cross-Examining Market Approaches to Protecting Endangered
Species, 30 Envd. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,721, 10,721 (Sept. 2000) (citing Oliver A.
Houck, Reflections on the Endangered Species Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 689, 691 (1995)).
5 See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a).
6 Todd Wilkinson, Nature's Next Crisis: Islandization, CHRISTIAN SCI. MoNITOR, Jan. 20,
2000, at 3.
7 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings &
Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 344-45 (1997) ("[Alny property holder who currently
farms his land, utilizes it for extractive purposes, or contemplates making improvements in
the future must worry about the ESA.... The ESA, in short, is every property owner's
nightmare."); see alsoJoseph L. Sax, Environmental Law at the Turn of the Century: A Reportorial
Fragment of Contemporary History, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2375, 2380-81 (2000) (stating that prop-
erty rights advocates were effective in conveying "that the ESA had an extraordinary poten-
tial to constrain economic activity").
8 See Francesca Ortiz, Candidate Conservation Agreements as a Devolutionary Response to
Extinction, 33 GA. L. REv. 413, 415 (1999); Ryan M. Beaudoin, Comment, Federal Ownership
and Management of America's Public Lands Through Land Exchanges, 4 GREAT PLAINS NAT.
RESOuRCESJ. 229, 250 (2000) (stating that "[t]he [FWS], under the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, has been given the authority to administer the ESA with regard to land animals" and
that "[tlhe [NMFS], under the Secretary of Commerce, has been given the authority to
administer the [ESA for many of the fish found in the Northwest United States as well as
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particular statutory guidelines, these agencies must decide whether to
list a species as either threatened9 or endangered' ° on the basis of the
best scientific evidence." Once an agency lists a species as either
threatened or endangered, several statutory and regulatory require-
ments come into effect, including limits on alteration of that species'
habitat and other actions that may adversely affect the species. 12
According to one commentator, "the list [of protected species
under the ESA] has grown explosively over the past 30 years; today it
includes more than 1,200 U.S. and 550 foreign species."'13 Addition-
ally, due to funding limitations, 245 species will remain on the candi-
date list,14 waiting for the FWS to formally list them, for fiscal year
2001.15
States and individual property owners sometimes view the ESA as
particularly burdensome because of the federally mandated restric-
tions on otherwise legal conduct, especially those restrictions imping-
ing upon property owners such as restrictions on land clearing and
construction. 16 As one commentator stated, "[t]he ESA, once the ap-
ple of Congress's eye, has become the whipping boy of property rights
advocates, who portray it as the embodiment of a federal land use
regulatory framework run amok.' 7 In response to this sentiment, as
well as to other influences such as the states' rights movement, several
states have attempted to preempt an ESA listing process by adopting
many other species found along the coast of the Pacific Ocean of the contiguous United
States").
9 "The term 'threatened species' means any species which is likely to become an
endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of
its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).
10 With an exception for pest species, "[t]he term 'endangered species' means any
species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its
range." Id. § 1532(6).
11 Id. § 1533(a) (1), (b)(1), (c).
12 Id. § 1538.
13 Holly Doremus, DelistingEndangered Species: An Aspirational Goal, Not a Realistic Expec-
tation, 30 EnvtI. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,434, 10,434 (June 2000).
14 A candidate species is "any species being considered.., for listing as an endan-
gered or threatened species, but not yet the subject of a proposed rule." 50 C.F.R.
§ 424.02(b) (2000).
15 Press Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Flood of Court Orders Preclude [sic]
New Listings of Threatened and Endangered Species in FY 2001 (Nov. 22, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter Press Release] (stating that the FWS "will not be able to consider the 245 species cur-
rently on the candidate list.., for Endangered Species Act protection"), available at http:
//news.fivs.gov/newsreleases.
16 See Ortiz, supra note 8, at 414 ("The [ESA] as it has been implemented satisfies
neither conservationists... nor property rights activists, who believe the Act has gone too
far... Property rights activists, distressed with this increased regulation at both the fed-
eral and the state level, have become more vocal." (citations omitted)).
17 J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the "New"Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering and Redefin-
ing the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENvrr. L. 1107, 1137
(1995).
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their own conservation plans.1 8 Similarly, the agencies themselves
have experienced a series of regulatory reforms designed to make the
ESA more palatable, flexible, and friendly to states and property
owners.
19
The situation states, agencies, and the public face during the ESA
listing process can be unsettling. Imagine a state official, faced with a
species within state borders that is a candidate for listing under the
ESA.20 Political officials want to keep as much local control as possi-
ble yet recognize that existing state regulatory mechanisms are inade-
quate. After obtaining input from constituents, compromising with
various political factions, coordinating with the NMFS, and creating a
plan that includes appropriate scientific and technical input, the state
adopts a local conservation plan. The plan is well publicized; state
citizens depend upon it and adapt their behavior in reliance on the
plan. Meanwhile, in a neighboring state, a similar process is evolving
in relation to a different candidate species.
In response to the change in the state regulatory environment
(one of the factors the NMFS must consider prior to listing a spe-
cies), 21 the NMFS determines not to list the species. However, envi-
ronmental advocacy groups and community organizations challenge
this administrative determination in the federal courts. The district
court overturns the NMFS's decision not to list the species and re-
mands the case back to the agency for further consideration, or even
orders the NMFS to list the species, concluding that the state must
have adopted and implemented the plan for at least two years before
18 See discussion infra Part II.
19 See Ortiz, supra note 8, at 418-19 ("In 1994, in an attempt to balance the competing
interests involved in ESA implementation and to focus more energy on preventive care, the
[FWS and the NMFS] began their own administrative overhaul of the Act, taking an ecosys-
tem approach to species protection."); see also Rebecca Cook, Groups Sue Feds for Better
Salmon Rules, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 13, 2000, at 9 (discussing the ESA rules and stating
that the "rules [did] something new by giving local and state governments more flexibility"
and that "[i]f [they] approve their own plans to regulate activities ... the federal govern-
ment will let them be 'exempt' from the .. .regulations"), LEXIS, Nexis Library, News
Groupfile; Christine 0. Gregoire & Robert K Costello, The Take and Give of ESA Administra-
tion: The Need for Creative Solutions in the Face of Expanding Regulatoy Proscriptions, 74 WASH. L.
REv. 697, 701 (1999) ("Because the ESA is a federal law that preempts inconsistent state
laws, it can diminish the independence [people in the Pacific Northwest] have long cher-
ished unless we take the initiative to recover and protect our salmon."); Lynda V. Mapes,
Groups Sue over State's Logging Law, Calling Exemption a Threat to Salmon, SEA-rrLE TIMES, Sept.
13, 2000, at B3 (discussing "an innovative approach to salmon protection" the NMFS cre-
ated and stating that the agency has "offered exemptions from federal rules implementing
the [ESA] if local and state governments adopt their own, federally approved salmon pro-
tections"), 2000 WL 5554180; J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative
Reform of the Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENvrL. L.J. 367, 372 (1998) ("The opening
salvo in FWS's administrative reform effort came in March 1994 with the agency's publica-
tion of An Ecosystem Approach to Fish and Wildlife Conservation.").
20 See supra note 14 for an explanation of the term "candidate species."
21 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (1994).
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the NMFS may consider it. Obviously, the state officials, politicians,
and the public are distressed. Their distress only worsens when, in the
neighboring state, a second district court, faced with nearly the same
situation, comes to the opposite conclusion. This inconsistent appli-
cation of legal standards in the face of similar state and federal actions
is indeed the current landscape for agencies, states, and the public
when the NMFS or the FWS accepts a recently adopted state plan in
lieu of an ESA listing.
Allowing states to essentially preempt an ESA listing when they
adopt their own conservation plans presents problems and opportuni-
ties, both of which this Note will address. There are several potential
problems: (1) local conservation plans may be less effective at protect-
ing a species than an ESA listing; (2) states may adopt these plans as a
prophylactic to avoid listing without committing the necessary re-
sources-political or otherwise-into following through; (3) inconsis-
tent approaches may promote confusion; and (4) the federal agencies
may wish to use such plans to avoid listing for political or resource-
related reasons22 not connected to the best interests of the species.
However, if states design locally adopted plans with the stringent re-
quirements of the ESA in mind, and if those plans have local support,
they may be more effective in the long run, because local individuals
will be more likely to buy into a plan their home state administers. 23
Additionally, states may make better use of local expertise and adopt
plans designed to avoid potential problems and take advantage of op-
portunities. For example, states may have powers outside the range of
the federal agencies to adopt measures not allowed under the ESA but
nonetheless helpful to the long-term viability of the species.24 Al-
lowing states to take the driver's seat will allow the federal agencies to
use their limited resources in areas in which there is less state coopera-
22 For example, in January 2001, the FWS announced that "the need to take higher-
priority listing actions first" precluded the listing of twenty-one species for which it had
received petitions for listing (and that still warrant listing) and the reclassification of an
additional five species from threatened to endangered states. Press Release, U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service, Service Announces Results of Annual Review of Findings on Petitioned
Species Awaiting Action Under the Endangered Species Act (Jan. 8, 2001), available at
http://news.fivs.gov/newsreleases.
23 See Cook, supra note 19, at 9.
24 "[The] NMFS strongly encourages comprehensive conservation planning for pro-
grams at the state level. State level conservation programs can be one of the most efficient
methods to implement effective conservation practices across the board and achieve com-
prehensive benefits for listed fish and their habitats." Endangered and Threatened Spe-
cies; Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened Salmon and Steelhead Evolutionarily
Significant Units (ESUs), 65 Fed. Reg. 42,422, 42,424 (July 10, 2000) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 223) (discussing state programs to protect salmon ESUs).
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tion.25 Finally, the flexibility inherent in local plans compared to the
ESA offers an additional advantage. 2 6
Part I of this Note will discuss the background and history of the
ESA provisions relating to local conservation plans. It will also outline
the current trends in several states toward adopting these plans and
discuss the agencies' adaptation of the statutory language to fit the
current political realities. Part II will discuss the current use of local
conservation plans and how they have fared in the court system in
various jurisdictions. The case studies included are those state plans
that have faced litigation in the court system, and thus present the
breadth of court commentary on the validity of local conservation
plans. Part III integrates the requirements courts have imposed upon
local conservation plans and discusses how these requirements will
help or hinder the ESA's fundamental purpose. Part IV concludes
with recommendations for a consistent approach to local conservation
plans. Specifically, courts or agencies should not impose an inflexible
standard for the necessary length of time for which the state must
have implemented its plan before an agency may rely upon that plan
in determining not to list a species. Nor should the courts or agencies
impose no standard at all. Instead, the standard should be flexible
and based upon the apparent threats to the species, how long these
threats have been apparent, and the likelihood that the plan will be
an effective substitute for ESA protections. In making their determi-
nations, agencies must rely on measures that are enforceable, not vol-
untary,27 and otherwise consistent with the purpose of the ESA. This
25 See Ortiz, supra note 8, at 421; see also Press Release, supra note 15 (stating that the
FWS will only complete emergency listings until after fiscal year 2001 because it must use
its already-limited funding to complete court-mandated critical habitat designations, and
that the FWS has designated critical habitat for only 134 species out of the 1,234 listed
species).
26 See Christine Golightly, Note, The Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative: A
Flawed Attempt to Avoid ESA Listing, 7 N.Y.U. ENrL. L.J. 398, 445 (1999) (stating that state-
implemented plans offer an advantage over federal protections under the ESA because
federal plans can "only prohibit harmful activity" while state-implemented plans can "re-
quire beneficial efforts" such as replacing culverts to improve access to streams for
salmon).
27 It is important to clarify that this Note uses the term "voluntary" in a very particular
sense. In the broadest sense of the term, all state plans are "voluntary" because the state
legislature, absent extraordinary circumstances, can change them at any time. This Note
does not use "voluntary" in this sense. Rather, this Note uses the term to mean actions
that, once taken, are not in some way binding. For example, a state could enter into a
contract with a landowner who, in exchange for money, will preserve habitat for endan-
gered species. Although the landowner is acting voluntarily when she enters into the con-
tract, once she accepts the terms and takes the money, she is bound to those commitments
and will have difficulty escaping them. This would not be a voluntary state plan compo-
nent (once it is implemented) under this Note's definition of the term. On the other
hand, if a state, as a part of its local conservation plan, included nonbinding recommenda-
tions to landowners about habitat preservation, this component would be considered vol-
untary under this Note's definition of the term.
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approach fits well within the traditional arbitrary and capricious re-
view of agency action. 28
I
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr: THEN AND Now
A. Early History of the Endangered Species Act 29
Congress adopted the ESA in 1973 to "provide a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened spe-
cies depend may be conserved [and] to provide a program for the
conservation of such endangered species and threatened species."30
The first half of the twentieth century had seen developments such as
rapid population movement, expansion of agriculture, and growth of
new cities.3 ' Because of these types of pressures upon species, Con-
gress found that some species in the United States had become "so
depleted in numbers that they are in danger of... extinction"3 2 and
that others had been rendered "extinct as a consequence of economic
growth and development untempered by adequate concern and
conservation. 33
The ESA lays out particular requirements for determining when a
species is threatened or endangered.3 4 In any listing decision, the
agencies must consider several factors, as set forth by the statute:
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtail-
ment of [a species's] habitat or range;
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or edu-
cational purposes;
(C) disease or predation;
(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued
existence. 35
28 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
29 This Part will provide only a brief overview of the ESA's history and purpose. For a
more extensive treatment of this topic, see MCHAEL J. BEAN, EN TL. DEF. FuND, THE
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (1983); RicHARD LrrrELt, ENDANGERED AND OTHER
PROTECrED SPEcIES: FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATION (1992); Oliver A. Houck, The
Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64
U. COLO. L. REV. 277 (1993).
30 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
31 David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws and
Local Decisions Eclipsed the States' Role?, 20 STAN. ENvrL. L.J. 3, 14 (2001).
32 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(2).
33 Id. § 1531(a) (1).
34 See id. § 1533(a)(1), (b).35 1d. § 1533 (a) (1).
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The presence of any one of these factors may justify listing a species as
either threatened or endangered.36 This Note primarily focuses on
factor D, "the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms. T37 Addi-
tionally, the ESA provides that the agencies must take into account
"efforts, if any, being made by any State or foreign nation, or any polit-
ical subdivision of a State or foreign nation, to protect such species." 38
This Note specifically focuses on the interaction of these two
provisions.
The ESA grants power to the Secretary of the Interior and the
Secretary of Commerce (and in specified areas, the Secretary of Agri-
culture) to authorize regulations to carry out its purposes.39 For ex-
ample, once the NMFS or the FWS designates a species as either
threatened or endangered under the ESA, certain restrictions upon
actions of individuals and agencies apply. If an agency lists a species
as endangered, restrictions apply to importing, exporting, taking or
interfering40 with the species, possessing any part of the species, or
selling any part of the species. 41 Because of the definitions of some of
these terms, such as "take,"42 the ESA prohibitions are exceptionally
broad. The ESA requires the agency to develop a recovery plan43 and
36 See iL
37 Id § 1533(a) (1) (D).
38 Id § 1533(b)(1)(A).
39 Id §§ 1532(15), 1533(a) (1). These Secretaries "in turn have delegated most of
their responsibilities to the FWS and the [NMFSI." Doremus, supra note 13, at 10,435.
40 See infra note 42.
41 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a). Specifically, for endangered species of fish or wildlife, it is
unlawful to:
(A) import any such species into, or export any such species from the
United States;
(B) take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of
the United States;
(C) take any such species upon the high seas;
(D) possess, sell, deliver, carry, transport, or ship, by any means whatso-
ever, any such species taken in violation of subparagraphs (B) and (C);
(E) deliver, receive, carry, transport, or ship in interstate or foreign com-
merce, by any means whatsoever and in the course of commercial activity,
any such species;
(F) sell or offer for sale in interstate or foreign commerce any such species;
or
(G) violate any regulation pertaining to such species ....
Id. § 1538(a) (1).
42 "The term 'take' means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." Id. § 1532(19). Agency
regulations have defined the term "harm" as used in the definition of "take" to mean "an
act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modifi-
cation or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3
(2000).
43 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f). A recovery plan includes:
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designate critical habitat4 in response to a listing of a species as
threatened or endangered.
The ESA also establishes a particular scheme for how the state
and federal systems will interact. Section 1535 governs cooperation
between the state entities and the federal program. 45 The ESA states
that the agencies must "cooperate to the maximum extent practicable
with the [s] tates. ''46 Consistent with the ESA, the federal agencies may
"consult[] with the [s]tates concerned before acquiring any land or
water... for the purpose of conserving any endangered species or
threatened species"47 and "enter into agreements with any [s] tate for
the administration and management of any area established for the
conservation of endangered.., or threatened species." 48 Addition-
ally, the agencies may "enter into a cooperative agreement. . . with
any [s] tate which establishes and maintains an adequate and active
program for the conservation of endangered.., and threatened spe-
cies."' 49 The first two provisions deal with the creation and mainte-
nance of any lands used for ESA purposes; it is the third provision that
is the focus of this Note. 50
(i) a description of such site-specific management actions as may be neces-
sary to achieve the plan's goal for the conservation and survival of the
species;
(ii) objective, measurable criteria which, when met, would result in a deter-
mination, in accordance with the provisions of this section, that the species
be removed from the list; and
(iii) estimates of the time required and the cost to carry out those measures
needed to achieve the plan's goal and to achieve intermediate steps toward
that goal.
Id. § 1533(f) (1) (B).
44 Id. § 1533(b) (2). The ESA defines critical habitat as follows:
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species
... on which are found those physical or biological features (I) essential to
the conservation of the species and (II) which may require special manage-
ment considerations or protection; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species...
upon a determination by the Secretary that such areas are essential for the
conservation of the species.
IE § 1532 (5) (A). Except in those circumstances the Secretary determines, "critical habitat
shall not include the entire geographical area" which the threatened or endangered spe-
cies can occupy. Id. § 1532(5) (C).
45 Id. § 1535.
46 Id. § 1535(a).
47 Id.
48 Id. § 1535(b).
49 Id. § 1535(c)(1).
50 Significantly, by their terms, none of these provisions allow the agencies to enter
into cooperative agreements with the states covering species that are not already desig-
nated as either threatened or endangered (that is, already under the protective umbrella
of ESA provisions).
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B. Agency Adaptation to Allow State and Local Conservation
Plans
In the face of criticism (and a hostile Republican Congress), the
agencies began a series of reforms, such as the "Safe Harbor Policy"51
and the "No Surprises Policy,"52 designed to make the ESA more
palatable for property rights advocates and to improve its chances of
reauthorization. 53 One such innovation was the FWS's adoption of
the Candidate Conservation Agreement Policy, which "encourages
landowners (both public and private) to enter into voluntary conser-
vation agreements through economic incentives and the potential
that conservation efforts will reduce the probability that listing will be
required" for species that have not reached a stage requiring listing,
but are nonetheless in decline. 54 Arguably, the ESA does not author-
ize these agreements because they apply to unlisted species and
"[n]othing in the ESA specifically authorizes the [NMFS and the
FWS] to enter into candidate conservation agreements, and little au-
thority exists for the [NMFS's and the FWS's] direct regulation of un-
listed species." 55
Even if the ESA does authorize such agreements, these agree-
ments were originally not a substitute for a listing, and the agencies
would proceed to list a species if the voluntary measures proved insuf-
ficient.56 However, the FWS "has ... used [these agreements] to such
a high degree that some commentators have accused the FWS of using
the agreements as a replacement for the ESA's provisions for list-
ing."57 The NMFS strongly encourages state plans:
State and local efforts like the Oregon Plan for Salmon and Water-
sheds, the State of Washington's Extinction is Not an Option Plan,
51 See Kubasek et al., supra note 4, at 10,726. "Under a Safe Harbor Agreement, the
FWS agrees to 'freeze' a landowner's responsibilities under the ESA if that landowner 'vol-
untarily undertake [s] management activities on [his or her] property to enhance, restore,
or maintain habitat benefiting federally listed species.'" Id. (quoting Safe Harbor Agree-
ments and Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,706,
32,707 (June 17, 1999)).
52 See id. at 10,727. "[Tlhis policy promises landowners that if they agree to partici-
pate in [a habitat conservation plan], they will not be saddled with further restrictions on
their land use. This policy applies regardless of future developments affecting the species'
chances of surviving." Id.
53 See Ortiz, supra note 8, at 464-65; see also Sax, supra note 7, at 2381 (stating that "a
new approach was critical to avoid a weakened reauthorization"). Note that the agencies
have justified these new policies based on the "inherent flexibility of the ESA." Ortiz, supra
note 8, at 488; see id. at 487-88.
54 Ortiz, supra note 8, at 465.
55 Id. at 488. See id. at 487-92 for a discussion of ESA provisions that may grant
authority over unlisted species.
56 See id, at 467-68.
57 Kubasek et al., supra note 4, at 10,726 (citing Martha F. Phelps, Candidate Conserva-
tion Agreements Under the Endangered Species Act: Prospects and Perils of an Administrative Experi-
ment, 25 B.C. ENVrL. Arr. L. REv. 175, 187 (1997)).
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Metro's Functional Plan, the Puget Sound Tri-County Initiative and
Lower Columbia Fish Recovery Board in Washington State, the Eu-
gene, Oregon-area Metro ESA Coordinating Team, and the Willam-
ette Restoration Initiative (WRI) have stepped forward and assumed
leadership roles in saving [salmon and steelhead] species. NMFS
reiterates its support for these efforts and encourages them to re-
solve critical uncertainties and further develop their programs so
they can take the place of blanket ESA take prohibitions.58
The NMFS's espousal of local plans that could supplant the ESA is
clear.
A local conservation plan must meet one of two standards to fall
within the provisions of the ESA. It must be adequate and active, and
under the first standard it must satisfy the following five-part test: (1) a
state agency authorized to conserve endangered or threatened species
must administer the plan, (2) the plan must include conservation pro-
grams consistent with the ESA, (3) it must authorize the state agency
to investigate species to determine if they require protection, (4) it
must allow states to adopt other conservation programs, including
land acquisition programs, and (5) it must provide for public partici-
pation in designating state-listed species.5 9 A court may partially ac-
cept a plan under the second standard if it meets the last three
requirements and provides for "immediate action" for the species in
most urgent need.60
II
STATE AND LocAL CONSERVATION PLANS: How THEY FARE
ON Tr= GROUND AND IN THE COURTS
Several states across the country have adopted local conservation
plans in the face of a potential listing under the ESA. Individuals and
conservation organizations have challenged agency acquiescence to
those plans in Oregon, Texas, and California. This Part will describe
the details of the plans as well as the challenges they have faced in
court.
58 Endangered and Threatened Species; Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened
Salmon and Steelhead Evolutionarily Significant Units (ESUs), 65 Fed. Reg. 42,422, 42,473
(July 10, 2000) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223).
59 See Ortiz, supra note 8, at 493.
60 See ia. at 493-94.
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A. Oregon 61
1. The Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative
In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley,62 several conservation
groups brought suit against the NMFS to force the listing of several
species of salmon. 63 The rivers of Oregon are home to several distinct
species of salmon. 64 Young salmon, fry, are born in and remain in the
rivers; however, as smolts, they migrate down the river and spend most
of their adult lives in the ocean before returning to the river habitat to
spawn, normally their natal stream. 65 This biological pattern leads to
two distinct problems in connection with the ESA: first, because
salmon tend to return to their natal stream, the fish have developed
distinct genetic strains,66 each of which the ESA may protect as a sepa-
rate species; second, salmon are uniquely vulnerable to changes in
their stream habitat because their breeding cycle relies upon a
healthy, cold, free-running stream. 67 Therefore, not only do salmon
61 The discussion in Part II.A. is limited to only one aspect of the controversies and
complications surrounding Pacific Northwest salmon and the ESA. As one commentator
has noted:
The systemic issues presented by listed salmon in the Snake/Columbia
River basin [in the Pacific Northwest] are massive, involving several states
and a neighboring nation, as well as Indian tribal rights, ocean fisheries,
hydropower production, fish hatcheries, land uses above the river, and a
variety of federal and regional agencies and laws, of which the ESA is only
one.
Sax, supra note 7, at 2386.
62 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1998).
63 Id. at 1142. "[Tlhere are twenty-three salmon runs, referred to by the [NMFS] as
'evolutionarily significant units,' now listed under the ESA, covering an area from southern
California to the Canadian border." Michael C. Blumm & Greg D. Corbin, Salmon and the
Endangered Species Act: Lessons from the Columbia Basin, 74 WASH. L. REv. 519, 522 (1999)
(footnote omitted).
64 SeeJennie L. Bricker & David E. Filippi, Endangered Species Act Enforcement and West-
ern Water Law, 30 ENVrL. L. 735, 742-43 (2000).
65 See id
66 The ESA's protections apply to species, distinct subgroups of animal populations.
"NMFS applies this definition to Pacific salmonids by evaluating whether a stock represents
an 'evolutionarily significant unit' (ESU). To qualify as an ESU, a stock must be 'substan-
tially reproductively isolated' and must be 'an important component in the evolutionary
legacy of the species.'" Id. at 743 (citations omitted) (quoting Policy on Applying the Defi-
nition of Species Under the Endangered Species Act to Pacific Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg.
58,612, 58,612 (Nov. 20, 1991)).
67 See Or. Natural Res. Counci4 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1146 (stating that factors contributing
to the salmon's decline in Oregon include forestry practices, logging and road building,
urbanization, disturbance of riparian habitat (such as increased sedimentation of the rivers
and streams), and agricultural practices and their consequences such as overgrazing, water
diversion, runoff, and soil compaction); see also Endangered and Threatened Species;
Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast Evolutionarily Signifi-
cant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588, 24,593 (May 6, 1997) (to be codi-
fied at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227) (finding that the important elements of water quality for salmon
survival include water temperature, water oxygenation, and lack of sediment and
pollutants).
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develop into unique species, but any one species becomes entirely de-
pendent upon the continued integrity of a single stream. As a result
of these and other problems "[d]uring [the twentieth] century, indig-
enous, naturally reproducing populations of coho salmon 'have been
extirpated in nearly all Columbia River tributaries and they are in de-
cline in numerous coastal streams throughout Washington, Oregon,
and California. '' 68
In 1993, several conservation organizations petitioned the NMFS
to list coho salmon populations indigenous to the West Coast as either
threatened or endangered.69 Among the species identified as an Evo-
lutionary Significant Unit (ESU)70 was the Oregon Coast ESU,7 1
whose "spawning escapements dropped from an estimated 1.0-1.4
million fish in the early 1900s to between 16,500-37,688 fish in
1991-92. '72 In response to the petition, the NMFS formed a scientific
review group to study the status of the salmon. 73 Although the group
did not consider the effectiveness of existing conservation measures,
in 1994 it concluded that the decline in historic numbers of salmon
showed that a listing was warranted.74
In mid-1995, the NMFS issued a proposed rule to list the Oregon
Coast ESU as threatened. 75 A few months later, the same scientific
review group that had reviewed the status of the coho issued another
report.76 The second report concluded "that 'coho salmon in [the
Oregon Coast] ESU are not at immediate risk of extinction but are
likely to become endangered in the future if present trends con-
tinue.' 77 The group based its conclusion upon low salmon abun-
68 Or. Natural Res. Counci4 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1145 (quoting Endangered and
Threatened Species; Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast
Evolutionary Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. at 24,588).
69 Id., 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
70 See supra note 66.
71 The particular coho strain at issue in this case was the Oregon Coast ESU, the
Oncorhynchus kisutch, whose range extends from Cape Blanco to the Columbia River (not
including the Klamath and the Rogue River basins). See Or. Natural Res. Counci4 6 F. Supp.
2d at 1142, 1143.
72 Id. at 1145 (footnote omitted). "'Escapements' are adult salmon leaving the ocean
to return to their natal streams to spawn." Id. at 1145 n.7.
73 Id. at 1146.
74 Id.
75 Id at 1143. Normally, the agency is required to issue the final rule within one year
of the publication of the proposed rule, but the district court extended the deadline "in
light of a three-month moratorium on listing actions imposed by Congress." Id at 1144.
Congress enacted this moratorium on April 10, 1995, prohibiting listing activities and elim-
inating funding for such activities. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; With-
drawal of Proposed Rule to List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed.
Reg. 46,608, 46,610 (Sept. 4, 1996). A Presidential waiver lifted the moratorium on April
26, 1996. Id. at 46,611.
76 Or. Natural Res. Council 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1146.
77 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting coho salmon status report).
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dance estimates, downward long-term trends, below-replacement
spawner-to-spawner ratios, habitat degradation, extensive hatchery
production, drought, and poor ocean conditions.78 After invoking a
six-month extension,79 the NMFS finally decided not to list the Ore-
gon Coast ESU, based in part upon Oregon's recently adopted Ore-
gon Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative (OCSRI).80
This delay was "critical... because it allowed Oregon more time
to . . . avoid[ ] [an] ESA listing."8 1 In October 1995, Governor
Kitzhaber launched Oregon's work on the OCSRI in response to the
NMFS's proposed rule to list the Oregon Coast ESU.82 The OCSRI's
goals were to avoid a listing, to restore coho populations, and to use
only existing regulatory measures and voluntary action.83 The team
charged with developing the OCSRI presented a draft plan to the
NMFS in August 1996.84 The OCSRI was the subject of both public
comment and federal and nonfederal scientific review before its final
adoption in March 1997.85 In its final form, the OCSRI contained
four key tenets:
1) an ecosystem approach that requires a systematic consideration
of the full range of attributes of aquatic health, 2) a focus on revers-
ing factors for decline and meeting objectives that address those
factors, 3) use of adaptive management and a comprehensive moni-
toring strategy, and 4) involving citizens and constituent groups
into the restoration process.8 6
The OCSRI's protective measures focused on three areas. In the first,
habitat measures, the OCSRI included both implemented and unim-
plemented measures, voluntary actions,8 7 and "adaptive management"
78 Id- at 1146-47.
79 Id. at 1144.
80 See Ortiz, supra note 8, at 482-83. For a comprehensive review of the OCSRI's
provisions, see Golightly, supra note 26, at 406-17. Note that preexisting federal conserva-
tion efforts such as the Northwest Forest Plan were among the mix of listing factors for
salmon in the Northwest. See Or. Natural Res. Council, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1147, 1155-57.
However, in the case of the Oregon Coast ESU, the NMFS concluded that the Northwest
Forest Plan was relatively ineffective because it governs management of federal lands,
which comprise only thirty-five percent of the Oregon Coast ESU habitat area. Id. at 1147,
1157.
81 Golightly, supra note 26, at 405.
82 Or. Natural Res. Counci 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1147.
83 See Blumm & Corbin, supra note 63, at 545-46.
84 Golightly, supra note 26, at 399.
85 Or. Natural Res. Council, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1147.
86 Id, (quoting the final version of the OCSRI).
87 For example, Oregon's local watershed councils, which are "groups established to
improve the condition of the state's watersheds," are voluntary. Endangered and
Threatened Species; Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast
Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588, 24,604 (May 6,
1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227). However, "[t]he OCSRI [itself] admits.., that
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with an independent scientific peer review component.88 In the sec-
ond, hatchery measures, the OCSRI depended upon a previous policy,
the Wild Fish Management Policy, that Oregon had designed to re-
duce the number of hatchery fish escaping into wild fish popula-
tions. 89 However, the NMFS had previously found that Oregon had
not fully implemented this policy.90 In the third, harvest measures,
the OCSRI continued previous management practices that had re-
duced harvest mortality from its peak in the 1970s to current levels. 91
Thus, substantial portions of the OCSRI relied upon previously ex-
isting measures (with some adjustments) and upon additional volun-
tary measures.
Less than one month after Oregon adopted the final OCSRI, the
NMFS scientific review group again considered the status of the
salmon. 92 The group considered two different scenarios: that Oregon
would fully implement the OCSRI, or that current conditions would
continue.93 If Oregon were to fully implement the OCSRI, the group
was "evenly split" about whether the measures would have an impact
significant enough to move the Oregon Coast ESU out of the "'likely
to become endangered' category."94 On the other hand, if current
conditions were to continue, the group concluded that the Oregon
Coast ESU, while "'not at significant short-term risk of extinction,'
[was] 'likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future."' 95
In April 1997, "[i]n an effort to improve the OCSRI and to sup-
port a decision not to list,"9 6 Oregon and the NMFS entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).97 Either side could terminate
the MOA with only thirty days notice.98 The MOA stated that the
NMFS had evaluated the OCSRI and concluded that its measures
needed early adjustments relating to habitat protection and restora-
tion.9 9 It further provided for cooperation between Oregon and the
NMFS regarding forestry practices, including a commitment from Or-
watershed councils still lack adequate funding, technical support, and the trusted relation-
ships with local landowners needed to be truly effective." Golightly, supra note 26, at 413.
88 Or. Natural Res. Council, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1147.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id
92 Id. at 1148.
93 Id.
94 Id. (quoting updated status review).
95 Id. (quoting updated status review).
96 Golightly, supra note 26, at 417.
97 Or. Natural Res. Coundil 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.
98 Id.
99 Id. The "NMFS promised [in the MOA] to guide the state towards those actions
that would make a listing unnecessary." Golightiy, supra note 26, at 399.
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egon that it would promptly consider proposals from the NMFS re-
garding changes to Oregon's forestry practices. 100
On April 25, 1997,101 after Oregon adopted the OCSRI, the
NMFS withdrew its proposed rule to list the Oregon Coast ESU and
determined that "'the Oregon Coast coho is not likely to become en-
dangered in the interval between this decision and the adoption of
improved habitat measures by the State of Oregon.' 1 0 2 While admit-
ting that the OCSRI does "not currently provide the protections
NMFS considers essential to creating and maintaining the high quality
habitat needed to sustain Oregon Coast coho over the long term,"103
the NMFS accepted the combination of the OCSRI and the MOA in
the place of a listing.'0 4 The NMFS further stated that if Oregon did
not implement the OCSRI measures and the agreements contained in
the MOA within two years, the NMFS would change the status of the
Oregon Coast ESU "to whatever extent may be warranted. " 10 5 Moreo-
ver, the NMFS would review its decision as a matter of course at the
three-year mark'0 6 because of its heavy reliance on the OCSRI. 0 7 In
the interim between the withdrawal and the implementation of the
OCSRI, the NMFS designated the Oregon Coast ESU as a candidate
species.' 0 8 Foreshadowing later controversy, the NMFS made the de-
cision not to list the Oregon Coast ESU amid substantial internal criti-
cism over both the legality of the decision and the likelihood that the
OCSRI would be successful in protecting the Oregon Coast ESU.'0 9
2. The Salmon Case: Oregon Natural Resources Council v.
Daley
Several conservation groups brought suit challenging the
agency's determination not to list the Oregon Coast ESU."10 The
100 Or. Natural Res. Council 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.
101 Id. at 1149.
102 See Ortiz, supra note 8, at 483 (quoting Endangered and Threatened Species;
Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast Evolutionarily Signifi-
cant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588, 24,607 (May 6, 1997) (to be codi-
fied at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227)).
103 Endangered and Threatened Species; Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/
Northern California Coast Evolutionary Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed.
Reg. at 24,607.
104 Id. at 24,607-08.
105 Id. at 24,608.
106 Three years is the life cycle of coho salmon. Id.
107 Id
108 Id. at 24,607; see infra note 152 and accompanying text.
109 See Or. Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1148-49 (D. Or. 1998).
The internal criticism also contended that, in the face of uncertainty, the NMFS's obliga-
tions were to err on the side of caution and list the species. Id. at 1149.
110 Actually, the Oregon suit is part of a long history of litigation between these parties
that originally began in California and involved many of the West Coast salmon species,
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plaintiffs advanced several different arguments, including violations of
both the ESA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA):"n that the
Oregon Coast ESU was threatened or endangered as a "biological
fact" and the NMFS had a nondiscretionary duty to list the species;
that the NMFS used an improper legal standard; that the NMFS did
not base its decision on the best scientific information as the ESA
mandates; that the NMIFS improperly relied upon both the OCSRI
and the Northwest Forest Plan; that the NMFS relied upon improper
factors; and that the decision was based upon political concerns. 12
Both parties moved for summaryjudgment."13 In setting the stage for
its decision, the Oregon District Court first discussed the definition of
arbitrary and capricious action. Arbitrary and capricious agency deci-
sionmaking, stated the court,
has relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to con-
sider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the prob-
lem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise. 14
The court also noted that, although reviews of agency determinations
are normally limited to the administrative record, the court could
"consider material outside the administrative record '(1) if necessary
to determine whether the agency considered all relevant factors and
has explained its decision, (2) when the agency relied on documents
not in the record, or (3) wvhen... necessary to explain technical terms
or complex subject matter."'115
The district court determined that the NMFS relied upon the
wrong standard in determining whether to list the species. The
agency incorrectly looked at the likelihood that the species would be-
come endangered prior to the adoption of improved habitat mea-
sures. 16 Instead, the NMFS should have determined whether the
species is likely to become endangered "'within the foreseeable fa-
but which the court transferred to Oregon after the only remaining dispute involved an
Oregon ESU. See id at 1142-45.
111 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
112 Or. Natural Res. Counci4 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1150.
113 Id at 1142.
114 Id at 1145 (quoting O'Keeffe's, Inc. v. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 92
F.3d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983))).
115 Id (quoting Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d
1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996)).
116 Id. at 1150-51.
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ture."' 1 7 The ESA requires that the NMFS list a species as threatened
if it is likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future.118
The court concluded that by shortening the time span relevant to the
period between the decision not to list and the adoption of the OC-
SKI's measures, which arguably would occur just two years later in
1999, the NMFS had relied upon an incorrect legal standard." 9 The
court characterized this as a "fatal flaw,"'120 noting that "the final rule
expressly warns that 'the habitat measures contained in the OCSRI
will not secure adequate high quality habitat over the long term."' 121
Adopting something akin to the plaintiffs' contention that the
species was threatened as a biological fact, the court stated that "[i] t is
incongruous for the NMFS to defer listing a species as 'threatened'
because the agency is hoping for a significant alteration in the condi-
tions or practices presently threatening the long-term viability of the
species, which in turn might prevent the species from actually reach-
ing the 'endangered' level."'122 Instead, the court argued, " [b]y defini-
tion, a 'threatened' species is one that is likely to become endangered
in the foreseeable future barring significant changes in the conditions or
practices that are threatening the long-term viability of that species."'123 There-
fore, the Oregon Coast ESU is a threatened species because it is likely
to become endangered in the foreseeable future unless Oregon im-
plements the OCSRI and the agreements in the MOA; even then,
these measures do not guarantee preservation of the coho salmon. 124
According to the court, the final rule only delayed a decision to list
using a mechanism not included or allowed within the ESA, which
otherwise contains very strict guidelines for the timing of listing
decisions. 125
Even if the NMFS had relied upon the proper standard, the dis-
trict court concluded that reliance upon an unimplemented, 126 partly
117 Ortiz, supra note 8, at 485 (quoting Or. Natural Res. Council 6 F. Supp. 2d at
1150-51).
118 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(20), 1533(c) (1994); supra note 35 and accompanying text.
119 Or. Natural Res. Council 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1151. Although the ESA does not define
"foreseeable future," the court concluded that it was unnecessary to define the term be-
cause it was certainly longer than the interval at issue and the NMFS conceded that a
reasonable time frame in the context of the Oregon Coast ESU determination was thirty
years, or ten life spans of the coho salmon. Id.
120 Id. at 1150.
121 Rd at 1151 (quoting Endangered and Threatened Species; Threatened Status for
Southern Oregon/Northern California Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of
Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588, 24,605 (May 6, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt.
227)).
122 d. at 1152.
123 Id.
124 Id,
125 Id
126 See id at 1153.
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voluntary, 127 and unproven plan was arbitrary and capricious and
therefore not an acceptable agency action. 128 The court determined
that none of the factors upon which the final rule relied 129 supported
the NMFS's decision not to list the Oregon Coast ESU. 130
The plaintiffs asserted that the NMFS may not consider voluntary
or unimplemented OCSRI measures.' 3 ' They contended that two
ESA clauses mandated this result: the "inadequacy of existing regula-
tory mechanisms"' 2 clause and the clause requiring that the NMFS
use only the best available data "after taking into account those ef-
forts, if any, being made by any State .. . to protect such species,
whether by predator control, protection of habitat and food supply, or
other conservation practices." 133 The first clause, standing alone,
"would preclude consideration of any future or voluntary conservation
efforts which, by definition, are not 'existing' or 'regulatory"' because
the clause is unambiguous. 34 The second clause, standing alone,
could allow such consideration of future, voluntary efforts because
"the language... concerning 'efforts' and 'other conservation prac-
tices' is much broader.' 35 However, the court determined that agen-
cies could not consider future actions because the two provisions of
the ESA that refer to consideration of state actions either allude to
"existing" regulatory mechanisms or speak only in the present tense
about state efforts to protect the species. 36 The court also surveyed
previous judicial opinions that would similarly reject the idea that the
NMFS could rely upon Oregon's future actions. 137 Therefore, the
court concluded that the NMFS may not rely upon future, promised
127 See ide
128 See id. at 1152-53. As the court stated: "However laudable Oregon's efforts to em-
ploy new management techniques.. . , such future, voluntary conservation efforts cannot
be a legal substitute for listing.... [I]t was arbitrary and capricious for the NMFS to rely
on future, voluntary and untested habitat measures .... " Id. at 1159.
129 The court listed these factors as harvest improvements, hatchery improvements, the
Northwest Forest Plan habitat protection, the improving escapement trend, the OCSRI,
and the MOA. Id. at 1152-53.
13o Id. at 1153.
131 Id.
132 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(D) (1994); Or. Natural Res. Council, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.
133 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (A); Or. Natural Res. Council, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.
134 Or. Natural Res. Council, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.
135 Id.; see id. at 1154-55.
136 See id. at 1153; Ortiz, supra note 8, at 485-86.
137 Or. Natural Res. Council, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1153-54. These cases, discussed infra Parts
II.B.2, III.B.1, and III.D, are Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, 27 F. Supp. 2d 739 (W.D. Tex.
1997), aff'd on other grounds, 115 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 1997); Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v.
United States Fish and Wldlife Service 945 F. Supp. 1388 (D. Or. 1996); Biodiversity Legal
Foundation v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1996); and Southwest Centerfor Biological Diver-
sity v. Babbit 939 F. Supp. 49 (D.D.C. 1996).
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state action even if the plan has been formally adopted at the time of
the listing decision.138
In a less textual argument, the court concluded that voluntary
actions are not enforceable, and therefore the NMFS cannot depend
upon them to protect the species. 13 9 Stating that "[t]he parties [had]
failed to shed any light on Congressional intent"'140 regarding the dif-
fering use of language in the two clauses at issue, the court proceeded
to apply the same reasoning it used to determine that the NMFS may
not consider future actions. 141 As the court stated, "for the same rea-
son that the Secretary may not rely on future actions, he should not be
able to rely on unenforceable efforts. Absent some method of enforc-
ing compliance, protection of a species can never be assured. Volun-
tary actions, like those planned in the future, are necessarily
speculative."' 42
Additionally, the court highlighted the NMFS's inconsistent ac-
tions regarding dependence upon voluntary actions in the context of
other West Coast salmon ESUs. Specifically, the court noted that the
NMFS had found a California salmon protection measure deficient
because "'landowner participation in the program is voluntary."' 143
Moreover, the NMFS had refused to consider the OCSRI when it de-
cided to list the Umpqua River cutthroat trout, another species in-
cluded within the provisions of the OCSRI.'4
According to the court, the NMFS could not give any weight to
voluntary actions in determining not to list the species. 145 Therefore,
the NMFS improperly relied upon the OCSRI. 146 Finally, Oregon's
voluntary and future actions were critical to the final rule. 47 The
court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 148 The
court later denied Oregon's motion for a stay of its decision. 49 In
that decision, the court characterized its finding that the NMFS "used
138 See Ortiz, supra note 8, at 485-86.
139 See id. at 486.
140 Or. Natural Res. Council 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
141 Id. at 1155.
142 Id.
143 Id at 1159 (quoting Endangered and Threatened Species; Threatened Status for
Southern Oregon/North Carolina Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho
Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588, 24,606 (May 6, 1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227)).
144 Id. at 1158-59.
145 See Ortiz, supra note 8, at 486. But see Gregoire & Costello, supra note 19, at 716
(arguing that the ESA's text authorizes consideration of any state "efforts," not just en-
forceable requirements).
146 Or. Natural Res. Council 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
147 See id at 1158, 1159.
148 Id. at 1142.
149 Or. Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1258 (D. Or. 1998).
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an improper time frame for evaluating the risk of species endanger-
ment" as its "primary finding."'150
B. Texas
1. The Barton Springs Salamander, Development of the Local Plan,
and Agency Action
In Texas, a similar problem evolved through a different chain of
events. The NMFS and the FWS initiated Candidate Conservation
Agreements as part of a policy to improve the public's view of the
ESA. 151 However, the agencies have sometimes used the policy in a
different and problematic way, responding to the adoption of a Candi-
date Conservation Agreement by stopping a listing proceeding.152
The District Court for the Western District of Texas concluded in
Save Our Springs v. Babbitt'53 that the FWS cannot rely upon future
actions of a state or unproven plans of a state in refusing to list a
species under the ESA.154 In this case, a local conservation organiza-
tion petitioned for the listing of the Barton Springs salamander that
lived in only one Texas spring.155
The Edwards Aquifer supplies water to a substantial part of cen-
tral Texas. 156 The Texas Legislature enacted the Edwards Aquifer Act
150 Id. at 1258. The court refuted Oregon's assertion that its previous decision grant-
ing summary judgment would result in irreparable injury because of decreased voluntary
conservation efforts by Oregonians. The court noted that Oregonians have other reasons
to continue their actions, specifically, to save the Oregon Coast ESU. Id. The court also
stated that the immediate cessation of funding was a "self-inflicted wound." Id In fact, in
1999, Oregon dropped its pending appeal and Governor Kitzhaber issued an "Executive
Order... that... contended that the OCSRI... would in fact play a prominent role in the
recovery process." Golightly, supra note 26, at 444-45.
151 See supra text accompanying note 54.
152 See Ortiz, supra note 8, at 480-81. Note that the Oregon Coast ESU was not a
candidate species at the time of the withdrawal in the case discussed supra Part II.A. Thus,
it did not present this particular problem because the OCSRI and the MOA did not techni-
cally constitute a Candidate Conservation Agreement.
153 27 F. Supp. 2d 739 (W.D. Tex. 1997), affjd on other grounds, 115 F.3d 346 (5th Cir.
1997).
154 See id, at 747-48.
155 See id. at 741 (citing Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal
of Proposed Rule to List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed. Reg.
46,608, 46,609 (Sept. 4, 1996) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The Barton Spring
salamander, Eurycea sosorum, "is a small, aquatic salamander.., species. It lives at Barton
Springs Austin's Zilker Park and is found naturally nowhere else in the world." Id.
156 See Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 112 F.3d 789, 791-93 (5th Cir. 1997) (dis-
cussing another ESA controversy surrounding the Edwards Aquifer, a suit over the endan-
gered fountain darter, and applying the Burfard abstention doctrine, see Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U.S. 312 (1943), to vacate the injunction of the district court). This case discusses
the applicability of the abstention doctrine to the type of reverse preemption discussed in
this Note (that is, when a state adopts a plan to preempt a federal listing process). The
court stated:
The Sierra Club argues that abstention cannot be used to create "nega-
tive preemption," meaning that a state cannot set up its own regulatory
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in 1993 to control and manage the use of the aquifer.1 57 The Edwards
Aquifer Act was subject to substantial controversy over the ensuing
years, including a declaration of unconstitutionality, which was later
overturned. 158 The Edwards Aquifer supplies water to Barton Springs
through the Barton Springs segment of the aquifer.1 59 The Edwards
Aquifer is a "karst" aquifer,1 60 which can transmit large volumes of
water very rapidly without substantial filtration.1 61 Therefore, it is
highly susceptible to water pollution. 162
The Barton Spring salamander is very susceptible to environmen-
tal dangers. It is "entirely aquatic and neotenic. ''163 As a result, the
salamander is extraordinarily dependent upon the springs within its
small range for a continual supply of clean, flowing water.164 Because
the Edwards Aquifer, a karst aquifer, feeds water to Barton Springs,
Barton Springs faces substantial danger from pollution. 165 Over the
past century, the number of Barton Springs salamanders observed has
decreased dramatically, from hundreds of individuals and abundant
populations in the middle of the century to around twenty individuals
in the 1990s. 166 In 1982, the Department of Interior designated the
salamander as a "category two" candidate for listing.167 Ten years
scheme and then claim that a federal regulatory scheme should be
ignored....
... [W]e agree with the Sierra Club that, as a general proposition, a
State should not be able to create a regulatory scheme and then claim that
federal regulation of the same subject matter does not apply. In effect it
argues the state Act has "preempted" federal review of its federal claim if
the federal court abstains. The response to this argument, however, is that
the same thing happens whenever a federal court abstains and the plaintiff
has asserted a federal claim.
Id at 797.
157 Id. at 792.
158 See id. (discussing the history of controversy surrounding the Edwards Aquifer Act).
159 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of Proposed Rule to
List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed. Reg. at 46,608.
160 Id. at 46,610. Karst aquifers, because of the presence of dissolved calcium carbon-
ate, contain naturally forming pipe-like structures that increase the permeability of the
aquifer. See id
161 Id.
162 Id. In fact, the Texas Water Commission itself found the Edwards Aquifer to be
'one of the most sensitive aquifers in Texas to groundwater pollution." Id.
163 Id. at 46,608. "Neotenic" means that the salamander "does not metamorphose into
a terrestrial form and retains its bright red external gills throughout life." Id.
164 Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, 27 F. Supp. 2d 739, 741 (W.D. Tex. 1997).
165 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of Proposed Rule
to List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed. Reg. at 46,610.
166 See id. at 46,608-09.
167 Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 741. A category two candidate species listing
"indicates that while data exists [sic] which suggests [sic] the species may be threatened or
endangered, further biological information is needed before [the species] can be listed as
threatened or endangered under the ESA." Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, No. 97-CV-
2330 TW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10366, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 14, 1999), rev'd sub nom,
Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001).
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later, two academics at the University of Texas petitioned the FWS to
list the salamander.1 68
In 1994, after missing several deadlines, the FWS issued a pro-
posed rule that would have listed the salamander as endangered
under the ESA. 169 The proposed rule relied upon several perceived
threats to the salamander. First, and most importantly, the FWS con-
cluded that the salamander was in danger from "'contamination of
the waters that feed Barton Springs due to the potential for cata-
strophic events (such as petroleum or chemical spills) and chronic
degradation resulting from urban activities."' 17 0 Second, disturbances
of the salamander's surface habitat contributed to the FWS's pro-
posed rule.17' Finally, increased groundwater withdrawals, leading to
reduced groundwater available for the salamander, potentially
threatened the salamander. 72
At this stage of the listing process, the FWS specifically considered
the adequacy of Texas's regulatory protections for the salamander.
The FWS concluded that these protections were inadequate for sev-
eral reasons, including:
a. The failure of [the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department] to list
the salamander on the State's endangered species list, thus denying
it the protection of that agency;
b. Ineffectiveness of State water quality rules and regulations to pro-
vide assurances of long-term water quality protection;
c. The absence of regulations prohibiting hazardous material trans-
portation across the aquifer;
d. The absence of retrofit provisions for water quality control struc-
tures on existing roadways;
e. The failure of municipal water quality regulations to apply
outside of the City of Austin's extraterritorial jurisdiction;
f. The failure of the State's "Edwards Rules" to apply to contribut-
ing zone, to address existing development, to prescribe site-specific
water quality performance standards, to address the effects of cumu-
late impacts on water quality in the Aquifer, or to address land use
or impervious cover. Further, none of the ordinances include re-
trofit provisions for existing developments or land use regulations
and those ordinance [s] in effect can be rendered ineffective by vari-
ance provisions and exemptions;
168 Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 741.
169 Id. at 741-42.
170 Ia- at 742 (quoting Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposal to
List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 59 Fed. Reg. 7968, 7968 (Feb. 17,
1994) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17)).
171 It
172 Id
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g. The absence of any legally enforceable commitment or incentive
for the City of Austin to change its pool cleaning and maintenance
to protect the salamander; and
h. The absence of regulatory authority over thirty to forty percent
of groundwater pumping as well as only limited enforcement au-
thority to control the pumping over which the regulatory authority
does exist.173
These deficiencies are clearly relevant to one of the factors the ESA
mandates that agencies consider in a listing decision: "the inadequacy
of existing regulatory mechanisms."'174 In responding to public com-
ments suggesting that the existing regulatory mechanisms were ade-
quate, the FWS stated that the existing mechanisms were not adequate
for two broad reasons: first, there was no information to show that the
existing rules "will be adequate to protect the salamander and its
habitat"; second, "there [were] no assurances that the existing rules
and regulations will remain in place and be enforced." 175 For exam-
ple, the state agency in charge of regulating the quantity of water
taken from the Barton Springs segment of the Edwards Aquifer only
has authority to regulate sixty to seventy percent of the total volume
pumped. 176 The FWS also expressed concern about the voluntary na-
ture of some provisions upon which commentors based their
remarks.' 77
Instead of making a final determination whether to list the sala-
mander within the year allowed, the salamander decision became em-
broiled in controversy and delay.'78 When the case finally returned to
the district court, the court ordered the FWS to make a final listing
decision.' 79 In response, the FWS "reopened the comment period to
ascertain whether any additional regulatory protection was offered by
the State.... On the date the comment period closed, there was no
173 Id at 743 (citing Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposal to List
the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7975-76).
174 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1) (D) (1994); see supra text accompanying note 35.
175 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposal to List the Barton
Springs Salamander as Endangered, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7971.
176 See id. Further, the FWS stated: "No existing rules or regulations specifically re-
quire protection of the... salamander or its habitat .... Furthermore, whether the ex-
isting rules and regulations can provide long-term protection.., is unknown." Id. at 7975.
177 "While the City of Austin has voluntarily committed to revising pool cleaning and
other maintenance operations in Zilker Park to assist in protecting the salamander and its
surface habitat, no legal agreement or other incentive is in place to ensure that these
efforts will continue for the long term." Id
178 The FWS first extended the listing determination deadline by six months. Save Our
Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 742. Then, after the same academics sued the FWS, the district
court found that the FWS violated its duty and ordered it to act. Id. However, the FWS
claimed that it was unable to make a decision because of a listing moratorium. Id. See
supra note 75 for details of this moratorium. Finally, while the appeal was pending, the
President lifted the moratorium. See Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 742.
179 Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 742.
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additional regulatory protection offered by the State of Texas."180 In
fact, the FWS reopened the comment period "in part due to the po-
tential for new information on proposed regulatory protection under
State authorities.'' 1 On the same day the FWS reopened the com-
ment period, "representatives from the State of Texas met with offi-
cials from the Department of the Interior to discuss the [proposed
state] Conservation Agreement." 8 2 Roughly six weeks later, the re-
gional office of the FWS approved the rule to list the salamander and
forwarded it to Washington, D.C. for final approval.18 3
Five days after the local office's approval of the final rule listing
the salamander as endangered, Texas agencies and the FWS executed
the Barton Springs Salamander Conservation Agreement and Strategy
("Conservation Agreement"), which promised future action to protect
the salamander.18 4 The Conservation Agreement had two goals: first,
"'to eliminate or significantly reduce the threats to the species," '18 5
such as "'risk of catastrophic events"' and second, to establish a cap-
tive breeding program.' 8 6 The Conservation Agreement further re-
quired Texas state agencies to take certain actions to meet the
Agreement's objectives. a8 7 About three weeks after the agencies exe-
180 Id
181 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of Proposed Rule to
List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed. Reg. 46,608, 46,612 (Sept. 4,
1996) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R pt. 17).
182 Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 742.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 742-43; Ortiz, supra note 8, at 480-81. "The Agreement include[d] a State
commitment to implement specific conservation measures to protect the salamander, its
habitat and the ecosystem, the Barton Springs segment of the Edwards Aquifer." Endan-
gered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of Proposed Rule to List the Barton
Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed. Reg. at 46,612 (emphasis added).
185 Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 743 (quoting Endangered and Threatened Wild-
life and Plants; Withdrawal of Proposed Rule to List the Barton Springs Salamander as
Endangered, 61 Fed. Reg. at 46,613). In fact, the possibility of catastrophic pollution
events was not farfetched. Following an "improper application of chlorine to clean Barton
Springs Pool, only 10 to 11 salamanders were observed and could only be found in an area
of about 5 sq. m (54 sq. ft) in the immediate vicinity of the Parthenia Spring outflows."
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of Proposed Rule to List the
Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed. Reg. at 46,609.
186 Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 743. Although captive breeding programs exis-
ted in two facilities, neither facility was able to bring hatching success above eight percent.
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of Proposed Rule to List the
Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed. Reg. at 46,609.
187 Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 743-44. The particular actions the Conservation
Agreement mandated were:
a. Enforcement and monitoring of compliance with existing regulations
and adoption, implementation and enforcement of currently proposed
regulations;
b. Prevention of catastrophic contaminant releases into the spring waters;
c. Prevention of degradation of the springhead habitat; establishment of a
captive breeding program; and development of a better biological under-
standing of the salamander population.
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cuted the Conservation Agreement, the FWS withdrew the proposed
rule, finding that "information now available... justifies withdrawal of
the proposed listing of this species as endangered. Various agencies
of the State of Texas have committed to expedite developing and im-
plementing conservation measures needed for the species and the
Barton Springs segment of the Edwards Aquifer."18 The "informa-
tion" referred to was the newly executed Conservation Agreement. 189
In its withdrawal notice, the FWS stated:
By protecting the water quality and quantity at Barton Springs
and in the Barton Springs segment of the Edwards Aquifer, the in-
volved agencies will reduce the threats to the species to the point
that it does not warrant listing. The [FWS] will closely monitor the
implementation of the Agreement and, if the Agreement is not ac-
complishing its purpose the [FWS] will consider the use of the full
range of its listing authority, including emergency listing, to protect
the species.190
The implication of this statement is clearly that the salamander war-
ranted listing at the time the FWS withdrew its proposed rule. The
FWS determined not to list the species despite the evidence that it was
in danger because of political pressure from the Governor and other
groups, 91 and in response to the Conservation Agreement adopted
just five days after the recommendation for a final rule listing the sala-
mander.1 92 Not more than one month after the recommendation to
Id, at 743 (quoting Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of Pro-
posed Rule to List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed. Reg. at 46,611).
Texas also committed to coordinating conservation activities, implementing a conservation
schedule, funding the conservation action, and assessing the progress of the conservation
efforts. Id. at 743-44.
188 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of Proposed Rule to
List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed. Reg. at 46,608; see Ortiz, supra
note 8, at 480-81 (stating that "despite the fact that the FWS regional office had identified
the salamander as facing 'imminent, high magnitude threats,' the FWS withdrew its pro-
posed rule on the salamander, finding that listing was no longer warranted.") (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 742-43).
189 See Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 742-43 (stating that the FWS "maintained
that 'because the commitment by the State of Texas to fully implement the cooperative
Agreement significantly reduces the risks to the species, the [FWS] concludes that listing is
no longer warranted'") (quoting Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; With-
drawal of Proposed Rule to List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 46,608).
190 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of Proposed Rule to
List the Barton Springs Salamander as Endangered, 61 Fed. Reg. at 46,615.
191 See Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 745. The court in Save Our Springs specifically
found that: then-Governor George W. Bush expressed his "'deep concerns because the
proposed action by the federal government may have the potential to impact the use of
private property'"; the agencies noted that the listing decision was a "hot issue"; and the
summary in the proposed final listing rule stated that there was significant opposition from
politicians, including the Governor, state and local agencies, and developers. Id-
192 See Ortiz, supra note 8, at 480-81; supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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list the species, "despite the fact that the FWS regional office had iden-
tified the salamander as facing 'imminent, high magnitude threats,'
the FWS withdrew its proposed rule on the salamander, finding that
listing was no longer warranted."193
2. The Salamander Case: Save Our Springs v. Babbitt
A local conservation organization challenged the FWS's determi-
nation not to list the salamander.19 4 The District Court for the West-
ern District of Texas criticized the agency's approach and concluded
that the state program could not serve as a valid basis for an FWS
decision not to list until the program had been in operation for at
least two years-sufficient time to test it properly, according to the
court.
195
The parties cross-moved for summaryjudgment 96 The court ex-
amined in detail the FWS's actions regarding the salamander. 97 The
court first concluded that "[n] othing significant appears in the record
between the [FWS]'s 1994 statement regarding the concerns of
Texas' [s] statutory and regulatory scheme for protecting the species
and the withdrawal of the proposed listing except the signing of the
Conservation Agreement."' 98 Therefore, the court inferred that the
Conservation Agreement was the reason the FWS determined not to
list the salamander and withdraw the proposed rule. 199
The court further concluded that none of the actions the Conser-
vation Agreement proposed for immediate implementation "signifi-
cantly reduce [s] the immediate threats to the species." 200 Specifically,
even if Texas fully implemented the measures in the Conservation
Agreement, the court concluded that these measures would not ad-
dress the concerns the FWS raised in 1994 regarding Texas's existing
regulatory mechanisms for protecting the species.201 The court
stated: "The effect of the measures articulated in the Conservation
Agreement on the species is speculative. There are no assurances that
the measures will be carried out, when they will be carried out, nor
whether they will be effective in eliminating the threats to the spe-
cies." 20 2 The court also noted the political nature of the salamander
listing process, especially the involvement of the Governor, and specif-
193 Id. (quoting Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 745) (footnotes omitted).
194 See Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 741, 745.
195 See id- at 747-48.
196 I at 741.
197 See id at 741-43.
198 Id at 743.
199 Id
200 Id. at 744.
201 Id.; see also text accompanying supra note 174 (noting the specific shortcomings of
Texas's regulatory protections).
202 Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 744.
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ically found "that strong political pressure was applied to the [FWS] to
withdraw the proposed listing of the salamander. '" 203
The court found that the FWS's decision not to list was an arbi-
trary and capricious action and struck down the agency decision, or-
dering the FWS to complete the listing process.20 4 The court
concluded that the agency may not consider the political aspects of a
listing decision. 20 5
The court further stated that the ESA itself includes provisions
for determining whether a Cooperative Agreement is adequate. 20 6
The agencies must affirmatively find-and must annually reconfirm-
that the Conservation Agreement satisfies these requirements. 20 7
These provisions, combined with another ESA provision that provides
for delisting if future developments mitigate the threats to the spe-
cies,208 mean that the FWS cannot rely upon promises of future action
contained in the Conservation Agreement to refuse to list a species
that would otherwise qualify on the existing record.20 9
The court also found that the FWS erroneously relied upon the
Conservation Agreement because the parties did not enter into it un-
til after the comment period closed and, therefore, the Agreement
received no public comment. 210 The court concluded its opinion,
holding:
When the [FWS] permitted an Agreement, with no proven
track record for effectiveness in protecting the species, to play the
pivotal role in [its] listing decision and when [it] considered politi-
cal factors in making [its] listing decision, [it] acted arbitrarily and
capriciously. Any listing decision that considers the Conservation
Agreement will be deemed by this Court to be arbitrary and capri-
cious until sufficient time has elapsed to permit the [FWS] to deter-
mine its effectiveness in protecting the species. This Court
considers a sufficient track record to be two years. If the [FWS]
then determines the Agreement will be effective in eliminating the
203 Id- at 745.
204 See id. at 748-49; Ortiz, supra note 8, at 481.
205 Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 747.
206 Id. Specifically, these provisions require the agency to find that the state agency
has the authority to conserve the species; the state agency "has established acceptable con-
servation programs, consistent with the purposes and policies of this chapter," and has furnished a
copy of these programs to the federal agencies; the state agency has the authority to investi-
gate the status of the species; the state agency has the authority to acquire land for the
conservation of the species; and the state agency has included provisions for public partici-
pation in the designation of the species. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (1) (A)-(E) (1994) (emphasis
added).
207 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (1).
208 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (c) (2).
209 See Save Our Springs, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 747.
210 Id, at 748.
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threats to the species, [it] can delist the species-if in fact it has
been listed.211
The court remanded the case back to the agency to make a final list-
ing determination, stating: "It may well [be] that the Conservation
Agreement passes with flying colors in its intended effect of eliminat-
ing the risk to the species .... However, absent some historical data
to back the decision that the Conservation Agreement is sufficient....
it is arbitrary and capricious to conclude that at this time."21 2 There-
fore, a conservation agreement could be a reason not to list a species,
but only if the agreement has proven its effectiveness and actually ad-
dresses the threats facing the species.
2 13
C. California
1. The Flat-Tailed Horned Lizard and the Conservation Agreement
The District Court for the Southern District of California came to
a different conclusion in Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt,21 4 apparently
conflicting with the decisions in Texas and Oregon. The FWS desig-
nated the flat-tailed homed lizard 21 5 as a category two candidate spe-
cies under the ESA in 1982.216 Seven years later, the FWS changed
that designation to category one.21 7 The region of the United States
in which this lizard lives has experienced substantial changes due to
human activity. Between one-third to one-half of the lizard's original
habitat "has been lost to agriculture, urbanization, military activities,
211 Id.
212 1& at 748-49.
213 See Ortiz, supra note 8, at 481.
214 No. 97-CF-2330 TW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10366 (S.D. Cal. June 14, 1999), rev'd
sub nom., Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Cir-
cuit primarily based its decision upon the District Court's faulty interpretation of the statu-
tory language "'extinction throughout ... a significant portion of its range.'" Defenders of
Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1140, 1140-46 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that this problem
alone would be sufficient to remand the case to the agency). However, in a concluding
paragraph, the court went on to fault the Secretary for failing to "address the lizard's viabil-
ity in a site-specific manner with regard to the putative benefits of the [Conservation Agree-
ment]." Id- The court concluded that "it is unclear how the benefits assertedly flowing
from the [Conservation Agreement] affected any particular portion of the lizard's habitats,
... unclear how the [Conservation Agreement] could have mitigated threats to the lizard
throughout 'a significant portion of its range,'" and unclear what impact the delay in im-
plementing the Conservation Agreement would have on particular portions of the lizard's
habitat. Id Therefore, in reading the analysis in Part II.C, one should consider the poten-
tial effect that the Ninth Circuit's decision will have upon the precedential force of the
District Court's opinion.
215 The flat-tailed horned lizard, Phrynosoma mcallii, "is a small lizard with horns on its
head and camouflage-like coloring .... [It] is typically found in the desert areas of south-
western Arizona, southeastern California and northwestern Mexico." Id- at *2-*3.
216 Id at *2.
217 Id. A category one designation means that, even though sufficient information
exists to support a proposed rule to list the species, other species have a higher priority
given available agency resources. I&
2001] 213
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
and the filling of the Salton Sea,"218 the large inland sea in southeast-
ern California. 219 Additionally, over forty percent of the lizard's re-
maining habitat was on private property.220
In 1993, the FWS initiated a proposed rule to list the flat-tailed
horned lizard as a threatened species under the ESA based on de-
creased habitat (and the high vulnerability of the remaining habitat),
species population decline, and the threat posed by pesticides and
drought threats. 221 The FWS was unable to come to a decision in time
to meet the rulemaking deadline. 222  Instead, it formed the
Rangewide Strategy Working Group (RSWG), composed of federal,
state, and local agencies whose mission was "to formulate a plan to
mitigate threats to the [lizard] population."223 The RSWG completed
the final plan, called the Conservation Agreement, in June 1997.224
Meanwhile, the FWS reopened the comment on the proposed rule
and on the Conservation Agreement.225 However, in mid-July 1997,
less than two months after signing the Conservation Agreement with
state agencies, the FWS made a final determination to withdraw the
proposed listing.226
2. The Lizard Case: Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt
Conservation groups sued the FWS seeking reconsideration of
the decision not to list the lizard.227 The FWS defended its decision
on the grounds that the lizard did not seem to be in decline in its
remaining habitat, that some currently existing threats were less seri-
ous than when the FWS first published the proposed rule, and that
218 Id/. at *3.
219 See Scott M. Rennie, Comment, Selenium in SanJoaquin Valley Agricultural Drainage: A
Major Toxic Threat to Fish and Wildlife Inadequately Addressed by the Central Valley Project Improve-
ment Act, 27 PAc. L.J. 303, 322 n.137 (1996).
220 Defenders of Wildlife, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10366, at * 3.
221 See id. at *3-*4. Specifically, the factors were as follows:
First, [the] FWS found that certain parts of the [lizard's] habitat have been
lost to human use, while the remaining habitat areas in the United States
face various threats, including off-highway vehicle... use, geothermal de-
velopment, sand and gravel operations, military maneuvers, construction of
roads and utility corridors, and agricultural and urban development. Sec-
ond, [the] FWS expressed concern that the species faced continued de-
struction of habitat and population declines. Finally, use of pesticides to
control agricultural pests, as well as drought, further threatened possible
negative effects on the [lizard] population.
Id.
222 Id. at *4.
223 Id
224 Id. at *5.
225 See id. at *6, *21.
226 See id. at *4-*6. In fact, the District Court for the District of Arizona had to order
the FWS to make a final determination in response to a suit charging that the FWS had
missed a statutory deadline. Id. at *6.
227 See id. at *7.
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the federal and state agencies had adopted the Conservation Agree-
ment.228 The plaintiffs responded that there was no significant
change in the status of the species between 1993, the time of the pro-
posed rule to list the species, and 1997, when the FWS determined not
to list the species.229 The plaintiffs further argued that it was im-
proper for the FWS to rely upon the untested Conservation Agree-
ment.230 Both parties moved for summary judgment: the FWS
arguing that the data did not warrant a listing, and the plaintiffs argu-
ing that the court should remand the case to the agency for a new
determination on whether to list the lizard.231
In considering the case, the district court first stated the standard
of review for evaluating the FWS's decision: "While the agency must
show that it has considered relevant factors and followed the required
procedures, if the court finds the agency has done so, the court may
not substitute its [own] judgment on the merits for the agency's judg-
ment."232 The plaintiffs argued that the FWS's decision was not sup-
ported in the record, citing Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley 33
for the proposition that the FWS may not rely upon future or volun-
tary state conservation programs. 234 They also argued that the Con-
servation Agreement upon which FWS relied was "strikingly similar to
prior management plans which proved ineffective."235
The court stated that its role is to first determine whether the
FWS considered the proper statutory factors.236 The court first dis-
posed of the plaintiffs' claim that the FWS's decision was inconsistent
with the record by concluding that the "FWS' [s] conclusion to not list
the [lizard] as threatened was a reasonable interpretation of equivocal
scientific evidence by agency experts that deserves deference in this
case."
23 7
The court then proceeded to the plaintiffs' second claim that the
FWS may not rely upon the Conservation Agreement.23 8 It character-
ized the fundamental flaw of the conservation agreement litigated in
Save Our Springs v. Babbitt239 as the lack of public comment upon the
plan, rather than the unimplemented and unproven nature of the
228 See id. at *6-*7.
229 Id. at *7.
230 Id
231 Id. at *7-*8.
232 Id. at *9.
233 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1998).
234 Defenders of Wildlife 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10366, at *10-*11.
235 Id. at *11.
236 See id.; see also text accompanying supra note 35 (delineating the factors considered
in a listing determination under the ESA).
237 Defenders of Wildlif4 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10366, at *17.
238 Id. at *18-*23.
239 27 F. Supp. 2d 739 (W.D. Tex. 1997).
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plan.240 By reading Save Our Springs in this manner, the court could
easily distinguish the instant case because, according to the court, the
FWS had reopened the comment period to allow "public opinion and
input on the Conservation Agreement" applicable to the lizard.241
The court did not limit itself to this interpretation of Save Our
Springs to reach its result. It also specifically rejected the rationale of
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Da/ey.242 It concluded that the ESA
required no implementation time period for testing the efficacy of a
plan before the FWS could consider such a plan,243 and that even if it
did, the Conservation Agreement had been in operation one month
prior to the FWS's decision.244 Because the agencies executed the
Conservation Agreement one month prior to the final determination,
it was "operational" and "properly considered" in the court's estima-
tion.245 The court based its analysis on the qualifications of the RSWG
and a presumption that refusing to consider newly implemented plans
would "discourage states from engaging in any conservation efforts at
all."'24 6 Instead, according to the court, the ESA encourages state and
federal cooperation: "The ESA was not implemented to discourage
states from taking measures to protect a species before it becomes
technically or legally 'necessary' to list the species as threatened or
endangered under ESA guidelines. '247 Thus, the district court up-
held on summary judgment the FWS determination not to list the flat-
tailed homed lizard. 248
240 See Defenders of Wildlife, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10366, at *20-*21.
241 Id at *21.
242 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1998); see Defenders of Wildlife, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10366, at *22 ("This court does not find [Oregon Natural Resources Council] persuasive.").
Notably, the court could have read Oregon Natural Resources Council narrowly, as it did with
Save Our Springs, by simply concluding that Oregon Natural Resources Counci's essential hold-
ing was that the NMFS relied upon an improper standard in determining not to list the
Oregon Coast ESU. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
243 See Defenders of Wildlife, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10366, at *22.
244 See id
245 Id.
246 Id. at *23. But see supra note 150 (noting that citizens have "other reasons" to con-
tinue their conservation efforts).
247 Defenders of Wildlife, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10366, at *24. Note that the court mis-
characterizes the plaintiffs' argument. The plaintiffs argue that the state formulated and
executed the Conservation Agreement when it was already necessary to list the species. See
id. at *7. Therefore, adopting the plaintiffs' proposed argument would not discourage
states from acting before it becomes legally or technically necessary; instead it would pro-
hibit the FWS from considering state action that is taken when it is already "technically or
legally 'necessary' to list the species." Id. at *24.
248 Id. at *24. The court also rejected the argument that agency consideration of vol-
untary measures is improper by stating that "it is irrelevant whether the conservation agree-
ment relied upon is mandatory or voluntary-as along [sic] as states attempt to make
continuing conservation efforts, they may be considered by the FWS." Id. at *22.
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D. Current Developments 249
The trend toward adopting local- and state-based conservation
plans continues throughout the nation. Because of this continuing
trend, the need for clear requirements for these plans may become
even greater in the future.
In California, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) has ap-
plied for permission from the FWS to exempt their bases from ESA
requirements that would otherwise apply because of the presence of
the Coastal California gnatcatcher, 250 the San Diego fairy shrimp,251
the tidewater goby,252 and the Arroyo southwestern toad 253 on the ba-
ses. 254 The USMC "is seeking to substitute its own conservation plans"
instead of following the rules of the ESA.255 Similarly, Washington
State reacted to the series of listing decisions for the area's salmon by
adopting legislation in June of 1999256 that "authorizes establishment
of a Salmon Recovery Funding Board that will fix criteria and allocate
funds for 'salmon habitat projects' and 'salmon recovery activities."' 257
Some other examples of state-based conservation programs are "the
completed forestry agreement in Washington [S] tate; ongoing reviews
of Oregon and California forestry practices; and development of
coastal states' shoreline management programs." 258 In addition, the
FWS has entered into an agreement with Oregon agencies to study
the red-bellied Oregon spotted frog, a candidate for listing under the
ESA. 259
249 Rumors circulate about a case in Maine that challenges an agency's determination
not to list a species in light of a recently adopted state plan. See Blumm & Corbin, supra
note 63, at 588 & n.472 (mentioning case regarding a Maine plan to conserve Atlantic
salmon that was challenged in the federal courts). Assuming such a case exists and is
pending, it would provide a useful case study in addition to the cases discussed supra Part
II.A-C.
250 The Coastal California gnatcatcher, Polioptila californica californica, is a bird native to
the United States and Mexico. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Species Information:
Threatened and Endangered Animals and Plants, at http://endangered.fws.gov/wild-
life.html (last updated July 9, 2001).
251 The San Diego fairy shrimp, Branchinecta sandiegonensis, is a crustacean native to
California. See id.
252 The tidewater goby, Eucyclogobius newberryi, is a fish native to California. See id.
253 The Arroyo toad, Bufo microscaphus californicus, is an amphibian native to California
and Mexico. See id.
254 See Seema Mehta, Groups Demand that Navy Follow Rare Species Ac4 L.A. Tiai~s (Or-
ange County ed.), Sept. 14, 2000, at A3.
255 Id.
256 SeeWilliam H. Rodgers,Jr., What a Salmon Czar Might Hope for, 74 WASH. L. REv. 511,
511-12 (1999).
257 Id. at 512.
258 Endangered and Threatened Species; Final Rule Governing Take of 14 Threatened
Salmon and Steelhead Evolutionary Significant Units (ESUs), 65 Fed. Reg. 42,422, 42,424
(July 10, 2000) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223).
259 See Alice Tallmadge, Three Agencies Join to Study Spotted Frog, OPEGONIAN, July 27,
2000, at D14.
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As a result of the continuing increase in collaborative efforts be-
tween agencies and states, court challenges to agency determinations
not to list species because of these cooperative efforts will likely in-
crease. Thus, the need to delineate the boundaries of acceptable state
plans that may substitute for an ESA listing is clear. Without clear
guidelines, state and agency collaborations will be inconsistent and
the standards that courts set for these plans will send conflicting
messages to other states considering the adoption of local plans. For
example, Texas currently operates under a significantly different legal
scheme than California. 260 Additionally, inconsistent results in the
district courts send conflicting messages to the public, undermining
the trust that constituents place in state-adopted local conservation
plans and their support for the development of those plans.
III
INTEGRATED REQUIREMENTS: THE CURRENT JUDICIAL
LANDSCAPE FOR STATE AND LOCAL CONSERVATION
AGREEMENTS TO PREEMPT THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
This Part will discuss the various standards that courts have used
to evaluate the sufficiency of agency determinations not to list species
in the face of a locally adopted plan to conserve the species at a state
level. It will further integrate those requirements into a proper stan-
dard, consistent with the ESA's purpose.
A. State and Local Conservation Plans in Light of the Purpose
of the Endangered Species Act
The purpose of the ESA is to conserve species that are threatened
with extinction and establish measures to enable the long-term sur-
vival of the species without continued ESA protections.261 The meth-
ods that the ESA uses to carry out its purpose involve very specific
limitations on both private and public actions that impact the contin-
ued survival of the species. 262 Courts must interpret the provisions of
the ESA in light of Congress's clearly expressed purpose; where the
statute is ambiguous, the court must defer to an agency's interpreta-
tion when that interpretation is based on a reasonable construction of
260 Compare supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Texas's legal scheme as exemplified by Save
Our Springs v. Babbitt, 27 F. Supp. 2d 739 (W.D. Tex. 1997), with supra Part II.C.2 (discuss-
ing California's legal scheme as exemplified by Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, No. 97-CV-
2330 TW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10366 (S.D. Cal. June 14, 1999), revd sub non, Defenders
of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001).
261 See discussion supra Part l.A.
262 Id
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the statute.263 In fact, in discussing cooperation between the agencies
and the states, the ESA specifically authorizes cooperative agreements
only when the state has adopted a scheme consistent with the purpose
and policies of the ESA.2 64 The general rule that the courts should
allow agencies to resolve statutory ambiguity consistently with the pur-
pose of the ESA265 will underlie the discussion in this Part and guide
this Note's conclusions regarding the proper standard courts should
use in evaluating agency determinations not to list a species based
upon recently adopted state conservation plans.
B. Time Limits or No Time Limits?
1. Must the State Have Already Implemented the Plan?
The three decisions discussed in Part II-Oregon Natural Resources
Council v. Daey,26 6 Save Our Springs v. Babbitt,267 and Defenders of Wild-
life26 8-each come to a different conclusion about whether the state
must have adopted and implemented the local plan at issue, and if so,
how long the plan must have been in operation-in order for an
agency to rely upon that plan in determining not to list a species. 269
The District Court for the Western District of Texas concluded that
the state must have adopted the Conservation Agreement and imple-
mented it for at least two years before the FWS could rely upon it in
determining not to list the species.270 However, the District Court for
the Southern District of California entirely rejected this reasoning,
dispensing with the requirement of an implementation time period
for a plan before an agency could rely upon that plan to determine
not to list a species.27 1 The Oregon District Court addressed this ques-
tion without adopting either of the more extreme positions taken by
the Texas and California courts.2 72
263 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44
(1984).
264 See 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (1) (B) (1994); supra note 206.
265 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 862-63.
266 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1998); see also discussion supra Part II.A (detailing an
Oregon plan to conserve salmon and the challenges it faced in court).
267 27 F. Supp. 2d 739 (W.D. Tex. 1997), affd on other grounds, 115 F.3d 346 (5th Cir.
1997); see also discussion supra Part II.B (detailing a Texas plan to conserve the Barton
Springs salamander and the challenges it faced in court).
268 No. 97-CV-2330 TW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10366 (S.D. Cal.June 14, 1999); see also
discussion supra Part II.C (detailing a California plan to conserve the flat-tailed homed
lizard and the challenges it faced in court).
269 See discussion supra Part II.
270 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
271 See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
272 See discussion supra Part IIA2. The Oregon District Court prohibited agency reli-
ance on an unimplemented, voluntary, and unproven plan, but did not specify a definite
implementation time period. Id.
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A determination of the proper standard for which state actions an
agency may consider must begin with the ESA itself, which includes
several provisions relevant to this question. 273 For example, the ESA
provides that the agencies must take into account "efforts, if any, be-
ing made by any State or foreign nation, or any political subdivision of
a State or foreign nation, to protect such species."274 Although the
Oregon District Court is correct in looking to the tense of the phrase
to conclude that this phrase means present and not future efforts,275
this phrase does not provide support for the conclusion of the West-
ern District of Texas that the plan must have been in effect for the
past two years.276 In fact, this clause may support the conclusion of
the Southern District of California that the agency could consider any
conservation efforts2 77 because a plan that the state only recently
adopted is still an "effort" to protect the species.
One must use caution in interpreting the term "efforts" in this
clause because the same clause, after using the term "efforts," lists sev-
eral types of conservation practices and then states, "or other conserva-
tion practices.''278 Although the California district court may be correct
in arguing that a recently adopted state plan is an "effort" to protect a
species, 279 one should interpret the term "effort" in this context con-
sistently with the rest of the clause.280 In this case, the clause as a
whole suggests that "efforts" in this context must be some sort of con-
servation practice. A recently adopted plan, if its provisions are not
implemented, does not represent a conservation practice as that term
is used in the statute using traditional tools of statutory construction.
However, this clause is not the only provision in the ESA that
could guide the analysis. The ESA states that agencies must "cooper-
273 See discussion supra Part I.A.
274 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (A) (1994).
275 See supra text accompanying note 136; see, e.g., Sharone Levy, Note, Balancing Physi-
cal Abuse by the System Against Abuse of the System: Defining "Imminent Danger" Within the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 86 IowA L. REv. 361, 382-83 (2000) (discussing the use of a
term's tense with traditional rules of statutory construction).
276 See supra text accompanying note 195.
277 See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
278 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (A) (1994) (emphasis added).
279 See Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, No. 97-CV-2330 TW, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10366, at *22 (S.D. Cal. June 14, 1999), revd sub nom, Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton, 258
F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001).
280 Two complementary canons of statutory construction require this method of inter-
pretation when faced with a statute containing a list of terms, including some ambiguous
terms. First, noscitur a sociis requires that words clustered together in the statute should be
interpreted as having similar meanings. Payson R. Peabody, Comment, Taming CERCLA: A
Proposal to Resolve the Trustee "Owner" Liability Quandary, 8 ADMIN. LJ. Am. U. 405, 441 n.189
(1994). Second, ejusdem generis requires that general terms, such as "other conservation
practices" in this case, should be interpreted consistent with the specific terms they follow.
Id
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ate to the maximum extent practicable with the States." 281 The ESA
lists the types of cooperation allowed and includes "enter[ing] into a
cooperative agreement... with any State which establishes and main-
tains an adequate and active program for the conservation of endan-
gered species and threatened species." 28 2 This language provides
additional support for the theory behind the conclusion of the West-
ern District of Texas that a state must have implemented the plan for
at least two years.28 3 The language "establishes and maintains' suggests
more than a program that the state has recently adopted in response
to agency action; it suggests instead a long-term program that the state
has actively followed. The implication from this language is that this
type of ongoing, long-term plan is a prerequisite to any cooperative
agreement between the state and the agency in charge.28 4
The Southern District of California incorrectly used one of the
five statutory factors that the ESA requires: the inadequacy of existing
regulatory mechanisms. The underlying assumption of the Southern
District of California's conclusion is that, even if the biological factors
support a listing, the agency may consider the "inadequacy of existing
regulatory mechanisms" factor28 5 and conclude that the recently
adopted state plan, even if unimplemented, was an "adequate" regula-
tory mechanism.2 86 However, the negative phrasing of the "inade-
quacy of existing regulatory mechanisms" factor is significant. Just
because the agencies must weigh in the balance inadequate existing
regulatory mechanisms when deciding in favor of a listing does not
mean that adequate regulatory mechanisms can weigh strongly against
a listing.
The obvious response to this argument is that the ESA allows, and
in fact requires, the agencies to consider other state efforts.287 This
response is flawed, as discussed above, because the term "efforts"-
properly interpreted in the context-means conservation practices,
not recently adopted state plans.28 8
A second response to this argument concerns the ESA's grant of
authority to the agencies to determine whether, on the basis of the
five ESA factors,289 the species is likely to become endangered in the
281 See 16 U.S.c. § 1535(a) (1994).
282 Id. § 1535(c)(1).
283 See supra text accompanying note 195.
284 See 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c). Additionally, a strong argument exists that this clause does
not authorize cooperative agreements with states that do not involve a species that is al-
ready listed under the ESA. See supra note 50.
285 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1) (D).
286 See supra text accompanying note 243.
287 See supra text accompanying notes 274, 277.
288 See supra text accompanying notes 278-80.
289 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1).
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foreseeable future.290 One could easily interpret the ESA as granting
the agencies not only the authority to use their judgment to forecast
the likely biological factors affecting the species in the future, but also
to forecast the likely effects of a recently adopted state plan. Specifi-
cally, the first ESA factor is "the present or threatened destruction,
modification, or curtailment of [a species's] habitat or range."291 In
order to forecast the potential for future, "threatened" destruction of
the species's habitat or range, the agencies must have the discretion to
consider the potential effects of a recently adopted state plan, which
includes future, and therefore unimplemented, measures.292 Accord-
ing to one commentator, "all 'efforts' a state might make to protect a
species should be relevant to the analysis."293
However, there is a fundamental distinction between forecasting
species survival trends based on physical and biological facts29 4 sup-
ported by data and forecasting the effect of plans and measures that
states have not previously used or tested. As the Oregon District
Court stated, the effects of unimplemented actions are "necessarily
speculative." 295
Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice296 addresses the question of whether the agency can consider
unimplemented plans of other federal agencies in the context of an
ESA listing of bull trout. One of the issues in this case was whether
the FWS could consider "ongoing management changes," including a
new federal forest plan, in refusing to list the bull trout.29 7 The court
stated:
These management changes were for the future, with uncertain ef-
fect on the bull trout species. However, as [the] FWS has acknowl-
edged, it is required "to base listing decisions upon an analysis of
existing threats." Thus, [the] FWS determines for listing decisions
whether a species "is an endangered species or threatened species"
based on the current status of the species. Moreover, it must make
its listing determination "solely on the basis of the best scientific
and commercial [data] available" to it. It cannot rely upon its own
speculations as to the future effects of another [federal] agency's
management plans to put off listing a species, and such reliance
290 See id. § 1532(20).
291 See id. § 1533(a) (1) (A).
292 See Gregoire & Costello, supra note 19, at 716.
293 Id
294 Examples of such biological facts include natural cycles of ocean temperature and
necessary spawner-to-spawner ratios.
295 See Or. Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1155 (D. Or. 1998).
296 945 F. Supp. 1388 (D. Or. 1996).
297 Id. at 1398.
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here again requires a finding that the decision was arbitrary and
capricious. 29
8
The FWS had implied in its findings that without the new manage-
ment changes, the threats to the bull trout were high, but with them,
the threats were only moderate. 299 The court concluded that the
"FWS... relied on factors that are contrary both to the provisions and
purposes of the ESA and to its own internal policies."
3 00
In the face of these inconsistent ESA interpretations, the ESA's
purpose of protecting species from the danger of extinction 30 1 may
provide guidance. The Southern District of California's conclusion
that the ESA requires no implementation period at all30 2 is relatively
inconsistent with the structure of the ESA as well as its purpose. The
ESA itself provides for a very specific timeline for the agency decision-
making process, as the District Court of Oregon suggested. 30 3 Al-
lowing the agencies to accept unimplemented actions, with the caveat
that if the state plans do not work properly the agency will then list the
species, essentially places an additional time period into the listing
process that the ESA does not authorize. It only delays a decision to
list using a mechanism that the ESA-which otherwise contains very
strict guidelines for the timing of listing decisions-does not include
or allow. 3 04 It also essentially allows the agency to wait and see if
planned, but previously unimplemented, state actions will work, even
though the biological factors justify listing the species as either
threatened or endangered and the currently existing regulatory
mechanisms are inadequate.
In cases of doubt the agency should err on the side of caution
and list the species, establish a cooperative agreement with the state
once it develops a plan that is an effective substitute for ESA protec-
tions, and then utilize the ESA delisting procedures if the species re-
covers sufficiently to warrant that action.30 5
2. Is the Two Year Requirement Really Necessary?
The conclusion that the ESA requires some period of implemen-
tation prior to the agency relying upon the plan, however, does not
automatically lead one to adopt the conclusion of the Western District
of Texas requiring two years of implementation. 30 6 One source of
298 Id- (citations omitted).
299 Id- at 1400.
300 Id.
301 See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
302 See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
303 See supra text accompanying notes 122-25.
304 See supra text accompanying note 125.
305 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c) (2) (1994); supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
306 See supra text accompanying note 195.
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criticism against this court's conclusion may be the arbitrary nature of
such line drawing-a common problem courts face when setting such
standards. However, the true question here is whether a federal dis-
trict court should set this standard at all.
Although the ESA's provisions and its purpose likely support the
conclusion that the ESA requires some implementation period, these
provisions do not specify or support one particular time period. A
hypothetical may reveal the harsh consequences of a mandatory im-
plementation period. Imagine that a species is newly discovered and
seems to be endangered. In response, the state in which the species
lives takes immediate action, develops a strong plan to conserve and
protect the species, and begins to implement the plan. Should the
agency in charge of the listing ignore such a plan? A two-year require-
ment in this case is overly burdensome to the state and restricts the
agency's decisionmaking, forcing it to commit resources to a listing
that is likely not necessary.
Another hypothetical may help to illustrate the other end of the
spectrum. Imagine a case in which the threats to a species have been
evident for some time and the agency in charge has taken action over
the course of several decades, gradually upgrading the species's desig-
nation from category two to category one.A0 7 Suppose that the state,
during this entire period, has not taken any effective action to protect
the species, despite specific findings by the agency regarding the par-
ticular inadequacies in the existing state regulatory mechanisms. In
this case, should the agency consider the state's species protection
plan enacted during or just subsequent to the agency promulgation of
a proposed rule to list the species as either threatened or
endangered?
A more sensible standard would look to the promptness of state
action compared to the known threats against the species and to the
effectiveness of the state plan compared to a federal listing. This ap-
proach is faithful to both the explicit language of the ESA and its pur-
pose, while allowing courts (and agencies and states) the flexibility to
consider plans that a rigid implementation period requirement would
otherwise preclude.
C. Enforceable or Voluntary?
Again, one must turn to the purpose of the ESA in first evaluating
whether a state plan must be enforceable before an agency can rely
upon it in its decision not to list a species. The critical question must
be whether the state plan is an appropriate substitute for an ESA list-
307 See supra notes 167 and 217 for an explanation of these terms.
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ing-that is, whether it will be effective in carrying out the ESA's pur-
pose of preventing extinction.
This analysis also requires an examination of the language of the
ESA, which grants an agency permission "to enter into a cooperative
agreement... with any State which establishes and maintains an ade-
quate and active program for the conservation of endangered species
and threatened species."308 While "maintains" was the key provision
for the timing analysis,30 9 in determining whether or not a state plan
must be enforceable, the key provision is that the plan must be
"adequate."
The key to the analysis, then, is whether voluntary measures can
meet the adequacy requirement contained in the ESA. In rejecting
the NMFS's final rule not to list based on the state salmon protection
initiative, the District Court of Oregon placed great weight on the fact
that the initiative created no obligation to carry out the actions prom-
ised.310 While such voluntary measures may be appropriate when the
biological status of the species does not yet rise to a level that warrants
a threatened or endangered listing for the species,311 they may not be
consistent with the structure and purpose of the ESA. The ESA itself
does not provide room for voluntary actions once an agency has listed
a species as threatened or endangered because the ESA's overriding
concern is the preservation of a species threatened with extinction.312
Because agency listings take time, failure of the state to follow the
voluntary measures could endanger the survival of the species before
the agency could act. The Western District of Texas placed emphasis
on the ability (or lack thereof) of the agencies to forecast future
trends premised upon voluntary actions. 313 Finally, the presence of
voluntary measures in a state plan suggests that the state either has not
marshaled the necessary political support to actually make some of
the hard decisions involved in protecting the species, or that the state
does not want to bind itself and its citizens to taking actions necessary
to protect the species.314
308 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (1) (1994).
309 See supra text accompanying notes 282-84.
310 See Or. Natural Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1155, 1158 (D. Or. 1998);
supra text accompanying notes 139-42.
311 For example, those species whose status warrants inclusion in programs such as the
"Safe Harbor Policy" and the "No Surprises Policy." See Kubasek et al., supra note 4, at
10,726-27; discussion supra Part I.B.
312 See discussion supra Part IA.
313 See Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, 27 F. Supp. 2d 739, 744 (W.D. Tex. 1997); discussion
supra Part II.B.2.
314 Additionally, an interpretation of the ESA that allows consideration of voluntary
measures is inconsistent with previous agency determinations. For example, when deter-
mining whether to list the Barton Spring salamander, the FWS discussed the voluntary
nature of Austin's pool cleaning measures and refused to rely upon them. See supra notes
177-78 and accompanying text.
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There is a strong counterargument that the language of the ESA
itself authorizes consideration of voluntary measures because the
agencies must consider any "efforts" states or foreign nations make to
protect a species. 315 However, the expansion of the term "efforts"
later in the clause suggests that "efforts" are "conservation prac-
tices."3 16 As two commentators have noted:
The "conservation practices" the statute gives as examples of such
efforts-predator control and protection of habitat and food sup-
ply-are not limited to regulatory programs. Such practices may
include nonregulatory efforts such as appropriate management of
state-owned lands, disease-control research, purchase of conserva-
tion easements, and campaigns to encourage conservation-oriented
policies and practices. 317
Additionally, the agencies must consider "the present or threatened
destruction, modification, or curtailment of [the species's] habitat or
range. '3 18 Therefore, the argument goes, the agencies cannot analyze
the potential for threatened destruction of habitat unless the ESA al-
lows them to consider state plans bearing on that factor.3 19
In light of the statute's ambiguity, the proper interpretation is
one that is more consistent with the purpose of the ESA.3 20 Agencies
should act consistently with their own interpretations and not con-
sider voluntary actions when determining whether or not to list a
species.
D. Lessons Learned
One can learn several lessons from the current trend toward
adopting state-specific measures designed to substitute for a species
listing under the ESA. First, "state conservation plans will not substi-
tute for species listings unless they are enforceable."3 21 In a similar
vein, courts may not accept voluntary measures because they are un-
enforceable, and any measures adopted must be binding upon the
state or local government itself.3 22
315 See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
316 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (A) (1994).
317 See Gregoire & Costello, supra note 19, at 716.
318 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (a) (1) (A) (1994).
319 See Gregoire & Costello, supra note 19, at 716.
320 See, e.g., Levy, supra note 275, at 382-83 (discussing the use of a canon of statutory
construction that requires interpretation of a clause consistent with the purpose and con-
text of the statute as a whole); Peabody, supra note 280, at 441 n.189 (discussing canon of
construction that "court[s] should look to the whole law, its object and policy").
321 Blumm & Corbin, supra note 63, at 588.
322 See supra text accompanying notes 139-46.
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Second, agencies may not rely upon unimplemented plans as an
excuse to refuse to list a species that otherwise qualifies.8 23 In fact, the
court in Save Our Springs suggested that a state must have enacted and
implemented a plan for at least two years before courts will consider it
sufficient 3 24 Although the language of the ESA does not support
such a bright-line rule, otherjurisdictions may find this court's reason-
ing persuasive. Alternatively, states and agencies may presume such a
rule to avoid reversal of their decisions and plans. In any case, "until
enough of [a] state plan's measures reach actual results that effec-
tively remove threats to a species, the [agencies] should not rely on
the plan in a listing decision."325
Third, based on both the text of the ESA3 26 and decisions of the
courts,3 27 the local or state plan must rely upon scientific evidence so
that there is a trustworthy basis for presuming that the plan will effec-
tively protect the species.
Fourth, the state plan should provide protections consistent with
the standards the ESA requires. Language in both Biodiversity Legal
Foundation328 and Southwest Centerfor Biological Diversity3 29 supports this
conclusion. The court stated in these cases that, if the United States
Forest Service had an existing plan that would protect the species at
issue "to the standards required by the ESA, then [the] FWS would
not have to enact its own plan."3 30 By implication, the same reasoning
applies to a state plan, especially because the ESA explicitly instructs
the agencies to consider whether the state's existing regulatory mech-
anisms are inadequate. 33' Additionally, the ESA's instruction to enter
cooperative agreements with states that establish and maintain plans
323 See Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 945 F.
Supp. 1388, 1398-99 (D-Or. 1996). Other cases have reached this conclusion as well. In
both Biodiversity Legal Foundation v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1996), and Southwest
Center for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 939 F. Supp. 49 (D.D.C. 1996), the District Court for
the District of Columbia concluded that it was impermissible for the FWS to depend upon
promises of future action by the United States Forest Service (USFS) in deciding not to list
a species otherwise qualified under the ESA. See Biodiversity Legal Found., 943 F. Supp. at
26; Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 939 F. Supp. at 52. In Southwest Center for Biological
Diversity, the FWS refused to list a goshawk in Alaska's Tongass National Forest based on
the USFS's promise to manage the forest to "ensure goshawk habitat conservation." 939 F.
Supp. at 51 (citing FWS memorandum). In Biodiversity Legal Foundation, the FWS made a
similar decision about the Alexander Archipelago wolf. See 943 F. Supp. at 25.
324 See Save Our Springs v. Babbitt 27 F. Supp. 2d 739, 748 (W.D. Tex. 1997); discussion
supra Part II.B.2.
325 Golightly, supra note 26, at 443.
326 E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (A) (1994); see discussion supra Part l.A.
327 See discussion supra Part II.A-C.
328 943 F. Supp. at 26.
329 939 F. Supp. at 49, 52.
330 Biodiversity Legal Found., 943 F. Supp. at 26; Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 939
F. Supp. at 52.
331 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1) (D).
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consistent with the purpose and policies of the ESA further supports
this conclusion. 33 2
The combination of these four requirements may prevent some
states from adopting effective plans that the courts will accept. How-
ever, these requirements may also prevent states from adopting inade-
quate and purely reactionary plans in order to prevent a listing. If
courts broadly accept the timing requirements from Save Our Springs,
the sheer burden of the timing requirements would prevent court-
sanctioned acceptance of plans that states have adopted in a reaction-
ary manner.3 33 This is because the state would have to have adopted
and implemented the plan for two years prior to a listing decision in
order for the plan to qualify.3 34 The two likely end results are as fol-
lows: First, courts will probably accept fewer local plans as substitutes
for an ESA listing. Second, however, those plans that satisfy the more
stringent requirements are more likely to be strong, effective mea-
sures to prevent extinction of species. These plans will likely be as
stringent as the ESA itself.
CONCLUSION
A broad overview of agency and court reactions to state conserva-
tion plans has shown that substantial disagreement remains regarding
the standards courts should apply when considering whether agencies
may rely upon recently adopted state conservation plans in determin-
ing not to list a species. In light of the continuing trend toward adopt-
ing such plans in the face of an ESA listing, the need for clear
standards and boundaries is clear. This Note has analyzed this prob-
lem in light of the purposes and policies of the ESA.
Although the language and purpose of the ESA suggest that the
state must already have implemented its actions at the time of the
agency decision, this Note suggests that courts and agencies should
not impose an inflexible or nonexistent standard to determine the
length of the necessary implementation period. Instead, the standard
should be flexible, based upon the apparent threats to the species,
how long these threats have been apparent, and the likelihood that
the plan will be an effective substitute for ESA protections. The mea-
sures upon which agencies rely in making their determinations must
be enforceable, not voluntary, and must be consistent with the pur-
pose of the ESA. This standard would allow states that act promptly in
the face of threats to a species to put forth their plans as effective
alternatives to an ESA listing. On the other hand, it would prevent
332 See id. § 1535(c)(1).
333 However, the two-year requirement may also exclude plans that should not be ex-
cluded. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
334 See Save Our Springs v. Babbitt, 27 F. Supp. 2d 739, 748 (W.D. Tex. 1997).
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agencies and courts from considering purely reactionary plans and
force them to rely upon other ESA mechanisms, such as the delisting
procedures, if the plans later prove to be effective in eliminating
threats to the species.
